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“After all, it really is all of humanity that is under threat during a
pandemic.”1
In February 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a “Public
Health Emergency of International Concern” due to the increased clusters of
microcephaly, Guillain-Barré Syndrome, and other neurological disorders in
areas recently affected by the Zika virus.2 That decision came only eighteen
months after the WHO had declared the West Africa Ebola crisis a “Public
Health Emergency of International Concern.”3 Back to back declarations by the
WHO of the highest threat level for an international public health emergency
underscore how quickly pathogens can now spread and cause devastation across
borders.4 In addition, these outbreaks highlight the need to implement lessons
learned from each pandemic crisis without delay.5
Most recently, the West Africa Ebola crisis demonstrates that laws to curtail
the spread of deadly contagious diseases need to be drafted and implemented in
ways to maximize community acceptance.6 Without prudently crafted laws in
place that are as consistent as possible with community mores, threats from
deadly diseases may cause anxiety and panic, and governments may react to
political and public pressures by mandating rules that ma y unnecessarily
impinge on personal rights and deeply held religious beliefs. Infringing upon
ideological or religious beliefs could lead to increased distrust of government
1. Margaret Chan, Media Centre: Influenza A(H1N1), WHO (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.
who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090429/en/.
2. WHO Statement on the First Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR
2005) Emergency Committee on Zika Virus and Observed Increase in Neurological Disorders and
Neonatal Malformations, WHO (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/
statements/2016/1st-emergency-committee-zika/en/.
3. See infra Section II.C.1.
4. See Seth Berkley, Zika and Ebola: A Taste of Things to Come?, BBC (Feb. 26, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-35614569 (“In the case of Ebola, what changed was its ability to
spread.”); see also I. Glenn Cohen, Traveling Patients, Traveling Disease: Ebola is Just the Tip of
the Iceberg, OUPBLOG (Dec. 14, 2014), http://blog.oup.com/2014/12/ebola-travel-globalizationdisease (“Diseases have long traveled with patients, and as the phenomena of medical tourism and
the more general globalization of health care grow, these problems are likely to grow as well.”);
Aileen M. Marty, Recognizing Ebola Is the Key to Prevention, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014, 10:42
PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/10/02/how-to-stop-the-spread-of-ebola/recog
nizing-ebola-is-the-key-to-prevention (“First and foremost, we must not forget, it is a small world
we live in. The bacteria, viruses and other germs have already figured that out.”).
5. See Berkley, supra note 4; see also Cohen, supra note 4; see also Marty, supra note 4.
6. See Jonathan Paye-Layleh, Cremation Ebola Beds in Liberia, THE STATE (Oct. 25, 2014,
7:00 AM), http://www.thestate.com/news/nation-world/world/article13903361.html (noting
Liberians had difficulty complying with an edict mandating the cremation of Ebola victims because
cremation was at odds with their tradition of spending time with their deceased loved ones before
burying them).
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and civil disobedience and could also, paradoxically, undermine the goal of
preventing the spread of infectious disease.
This Article focuses on a critical lesson from prior crises—the need for public
health officials to accommodate religious and cultural practices of the
community to effectively implement emergency measures for future
pandemics.7 The need for proactive accommodation of cultural and religious
practices when attempting to prevent the spread of infectious disease is made
clear by an examination of certain recent infectious disease threats. Thus, Part I
describes some of these existing and emerging threats, including Zika, Ebola,
Influenza, and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV). Part II
explores the role of governmental authorities in preventing the spread of
contagious diseases during public health emergencies. It reviews constitutional,
state, and international laws and regulations that may apply during infectious
disease threats and examines how some laws attempting to contain the spread of
infectious disease conflict with religious and cultural practices, particularly
death rituals. It also addresses how religious and cultural practices should be
accommodated in light of the lessons learned from the West Africa Ebola crisis
and the Sin Nombre outbreak in the United States. Part III describes survivors’
legal rights regarding human remains and the import of religious and cultural
death rituals. Part IV sets forth a proposal, taking into account interdisciplinary
approaches and ethical and policy considerations for such accommodations.
Finally, the Article concludes with recommendations in hopes of triggering
further discussion.
I. TRANSMISSION OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE
Microbes can cause outbreaks of infectious disease that may lead to public
health emergencies.8 Microbes enter the body through the eyes, respiratory tract,
gastrointestinal tract, urogenital tract, or skin.9 Some microbes can bore their
7. There is scholarship addressing the ethical concerns arising from government attempts to
control infectious diseases. See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Ebola and the Law in the United States: A
Short Guide to Public Health Authority and Practical Limits, EMORY LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER
NO. 14-299 1, 19-21 (Dec. 14, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2538187 (noting that governments’ attempts to control the spread of infectious disease can cause
the unintentional ostracization of quarantined individuals, violate the privacy rights of people who
do not consent to screenings for disease, and impinge on the right of doctors to refuse to treat people
whom they fear may have a contagious disease).
8. See Michael G. Baker & Andrew M. Forsyth, The New International Health Regulations:
A Revolutionary Change in Global Health Security, 120 J. N.Z. MED. ASS’N. 98, 99 (2007).
9. See VA Shanmuganathan et al., External Ocular Infections Due to Methinicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA), 19 EYE 284, 284–85 (2005); see also Michael T. Osterholm &
Craig W. Hedberg, Epidemiologic Principles, in GERALD L. MANDELL ET AL., MANDELL,
DOUGLAS, AND BENNETT’S PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 185, 187–89
(7th ed. 2010) (describing infections in the gastrointestinal system, infections spread through sexual
intercourse, and infections that enter through the skin).
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way into the body.10 Others can be injected via a bite11 or by a mechanical device
into the skin or simply drop into a deep penetrating wound or compound
fracture.12 They may be transmitted through sexual contact, close contamination
of mucous membranes, bites from infected animals, and skin damaged by
accidental or deliberate trauma, including injections.13
Microbes exist in humans, animals, plants, within other microorganisms, and
throughout the Earth.14 Between species, microbes can be shared deliberately,
directly, or indirectly.15 Carriers of microbes (vectors) can be plants, arthropods
(e.g., mosquitos, ticks, mites, etc.), rodents, or other animals.16 A vector can
even include a microorganism infected with a microbe that causes disease in
humans.17 Microbes can also be conveyed within food, beverages, aerosols,
respiratory droplets, body fluids, or fomites,18 including shrapnel and other
deliberate ways of injecting microbes into people or animals.19
The more ease with which microbes spread from person to person (directly or
via a vector), the more infectious they are.20 Microbes transmitted by aerosols
and vectors generally spread faster than those that require intimate contact.21 A
microbe that can be spread by a vector or an aerosol might also be spread by
10. See, e.g., Wayne M. Meyers et al., Ancylostomiasis, in PATHOLOGY OF INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 360–61 (2000).
11. Ronald C. Neafie et al., Onchocerciasis, in PATHOLOGY OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 29394 (2000).
12. Dominique Chauveaux, Preventing Surgical-Site Infections: Measures Other than
Antibiotics, 101 ORTHOPAEDICS & TRAUMATOLOGY: SURGERY & RES. S77, S77 (2015).
13. See Khoi Do et al., HIV Risks Among Injecting Drug Users in Vietnam: A Review of the
Research Evidence, 10 CURRENT HIV RES. 479, 479–80 (2012); see also Inger K. Damon,
Smallpox, Monkeypox, and Other Poxvirus Infections, in GOLDMAN-CECIL MEDICINE 2215 (25th
ed. 2016) (describing the spread of tanapox virus through “an insect or arthropod intermediary”).
14. MARTIN J. BLASER, MISSING MICROBES: HOW THE OVERUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS IS
FUELING OUR MODERN PLAGUES 12–14 (2014).
15. Osterholm & Hedberg, supra note 9, at 186.
16. Cf. Selwyn Arlington Headley et al., Neorickettsia Helminthoeca and Salmon Poisoning
Disease: A Review, 187 VETERINARY J. 165, 165–67 (2011) (showing examples of living vectors
by following a bacterium’s numerous hosts, which include snails, salmon, fish-eating birds, dogs,
and bears).
17. Elena V. Orlova, How Viruses Infect Bacteria?, 28 EMBO J. 797, 797 (2009).
18. Damon, supra note 13, at 2215–16.
19. See, e.g., Robert Carija et al., Surgical Removal of Metallic Foreign Body (Shrapnel) from
the Lumbosacral Spine and the Treatment of Chronic Osteomyelitis: A Case Report, 63 W. INDIAN
MED. J. 373, 374–75 (2014) (stating shrapnel should be removed from a wound if possible to aver
the risk of a staphylococcus infection).
20. Osterholm & Hedberg, supra note 9, at 186.
21. See Kousuke Hanada et al., A Large Variation in the Rates of Synonymous Substitution
for RNA Viruses and Its Relationship to a Diversity of Viral Infection and Transmission Modes, 21
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY & EVOLUTION 1074, 1079 (2004) (showing a chart indicating that viruses
spread more quickly and replicate more frequently when spread among hosts via aerosols than via
blood).
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intimate contact or other means.22 Although infectiousness is a key concern,
another important concern is the type of harm (i.e., long-term consequences or
death) the microbe can inflict on a majority of those it infects.23
For example, Zika virus has been documented to spread by mosquitos, by
people during sexual contact, and by pregnant mothers to their children.24 In
addition, aspects of Zika virus, coupled with studies of similar viruses, such as
West Nile virus, have led the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to issue
guidelines to avert transmission of Zika through blood transfusions.25 The
effects of a Zika infection may be devastating. A mother infected with Zika may
suffer a miscarriage or give birth to a child with microcephaly, a serious
neurological condition.26 Zika can also cause Guillain-Barré Syndrome, a
neurological disease that leads to potentially fatal paralysis.27
Other emerging threats, such as MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV, and influenza, are
transmissible by aerosol and can spread rapidly from person to person.28 How
these viruses enter the respiratory tract, including which cells become infected,
leads to differences in the degree to which they are contagious. This is true even
among different species, types, strains, and clads of the same virus. For
22. See, e.g., Damon, supra note 13, at 2215 (noting that, although smallpox normally entered
the human body through inhalation, smallpox could be spread through the scabs of infected
individuals).
23. Osterholm & Hedberg, supra note 9, at 186 (indicating that another concern for
epidemiologists is “[t]he gradient of infection . . . [which] is the range of manifestations of illness
in the host resulting from infection with an agent [that] extends from death at one extreme to
inapparent or subdinical illness at the other”).
24. Pregnancy Management In the Context of Zika Virus Infection, WHO, 1 (May 13, 2016),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/204520/1/WHO_ZIKV_MOC_16.2_eng.pdf?ua=1
(noting “there is increasing evidence that maternal-fetal transmission of Zika virus can occur
throughout pregnancy”); Prevention of Sexual Transmission of Zika Virus, WHO, 1 (June 7, 2016),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/204421/1/WHO_ZIKV_MOC_16.1_eng.pdf?ua=1
(noting the sexual transmission of Zika virus through the semen of symptomatic males); Risk
Communication in the Context of Zika Virus, WHO, 2 (Mar. 1, 2016), http://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/10665/204513/1/WHO_ZIKV_RCCE_16.1_eng.pdf (noting Zika virus is spread by a
mosquito that also transmits dengue and chikungunya).
25. E.g., Recommendations for Donor Screening, Deferral, and Product Management to
Reduce the Risk of Transfusion-Transmission of Zika Virus: Guidance for Industry, FDA, 1–17
(Feb. 2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegu
latoryInformation/Guidances/Blood/UCM486360.pdf.
26. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., W.H.O. Advises Pregnant Women to Avoid Areas Where Zika Is
Spreading, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/09/health/zika-virus-pre
gant-women-travel.html?_r=0.
27. See generally Van-Mai Cao-Lormeau et al., Guillain-Barré Syndrome Outbreak
Associated with Zika Virus Infection in French Polynesia: A Case-Control Study, 387 LANCET
1531 (2016), http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2816%29005626/fulltext.
28. W.H. Seto, Airborne Transmission and Precautions: Facts and Myths, 89 J. HOSP
INFECTION 225, 225–26 (2015); Rachael M. Jones & Lisa M. Brosseau, Aerosol Transmission of
Infectious Disease, 57 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 504–05 (2015).
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example, the 2004 H5N1 (avian influenza) was a very deadly flu virus, but not
very contagious; by contrast, the 2009-H1N1 influenza virus was less dangerous,
but more contagious.29 Most coronaviruses cause the common cold in humans.30
However, two recently recognized coronaviruses—SARS-CoV and MERSCoV—are causing a growing concern.31 These two coronaviruses have
devastating effects because they produce very severe lung disease “with
alarmingly high case fatality rates.”32
The scientific community understands how pathogens enter bodies, can be
highly contagious, and can sometimes cause great morbidity and mortality. 33
However, the world is filled with microbes, each with its own unique aspects,
any of which may be altered at any time (by environmental, human, or other
action) to become pathogenic to humans. Thus, the scientific community cannot
know which pathogens will constitute the next contagious, deadly, or
catastrophic outbreak or which modes of transmission will present the greatest
risk.34 Moreover, certain religious customs and cultural practices may hinder
29. Tjandra Y. Aditama et al., Avian Influenza H5N1 Transmission in Households, Indonesia,
7 PLOS ONE e29971, e29971 (2012); B. Bett et al., Transmission Rate and Reproductive Number
of the H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus During the December 2005–July 2008
Epidemic in Nigeria, 61 TRANSBOUNDARY & EMERGING DISEASES 60, 67 (2014); Sanhong Liu et
al., On Avian Influenza Epidemic Models with Time Delay, 134 THEORY BIOSCI. 75, 75 (2015).
30. See Stephen B. Greenberg, Rhinovirus and Coronavirus Infections, 28 SEMINARS IN
RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 182, 184 (2007).
31. Rahul Vijay & Stanley Perlman, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome and Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome, 16 CURRENT OP. IN VIROLOGY 70, 70 (2016).
32. Id.
33. Bess B. Ward, How Many Species of Prokaryotes Are There? 99 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 10234, 10234 (2002), http://www.pnas.org/content/99/16/10234.full; Carl
Zimmer, An Infinity of Viruses, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 20, 2013), http://phenomena.nat
ionalgeographic.com/2013/02/20/an-infinity-of-viruses/.
34. See Hans Heesterbeek et al., Modeling Infectious Disease Dynamics in the Complex
Landscape of Global Health, 347 SCI. 1216, aaa4339-1 (2015). Catastrophic infectious diseases
are those which impact large numbers of people—some directly, some indirectly—leading to large
numbers of critically ill people, mass numbers of worried-well, and overwhelmed public and
private health care systems. They can produce social and economic havoc the consequences of
which may continue long after the epidemic subsides. The more rapidly an infection spreads, the
more people who are infected by any given single source, and the more devastating the effects of
the disease in terms of the nature of the illness and the likelihood of death, the greater and more
serious the threat and the more critical the need for appropriate governmental action.
Any number of currently recognized and unrecognized pathogens can, under specific
circumstances, get out of control and become catastrophic outbreaks. The recent West Africa Ebola
outbreak, although massive and catastrophic to the three countries that bore the brunt of the attack,
could have been far worse had a public health emergency of international concern not been declared
and the disease been allowed to spread widely throughout the world. During the West Africa
outbreak, only ten patients were treated in the United States; of these cases, only four manifested
in the United States, two were patients exposed in Africa, two were exposed to an infected case,
and six persons were transported back from West Africa for treatment in the United States. These
minimal numbers of cases nearly overwhelmed the U.S. health system. This underscores the
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identifying the next emerging threat and containing a spread. For example,
religious practices may prohibit certain scientific tests—such as autopsies— that
could be helpful in diagnosing emerging pathogens.35 Thus, laws to prevent the
spread of the next pandemic must be medically sound and, from the lessons
learned from prior outbreaks, should also accommodate religious and cultural
practices.
II. PROACTIVE ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL PRACTICES
TO PREVENT SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE
With the ease of global movement, every country in the world is vulnerable
to severe infectious diseases that emerge, or reemerge, in any part of the world.36
What role do governmental authorities have in preventing the spread of deadly
contagious diseases during public health emergencies? In light of the global
nature of the threat of the spread of infectious disease,37 containment requires
putting legal frameworks in place at all of the following levels: international,
national, state, tribal, territorial, and local. This framework needs to include
governmental authorities, as well as private actors–both profit and non-profit.38
A. International Framework
Clearly, international cooperation and coordination is vital to prevent a global
disease crisis. A framework exists for such cooperation. In a dramatic example
of worldwide cooperation, each of the WHO’s 194 member states are bound by
the revised International Health Regulations (IHR), which became effective in
2007.39
concern that not only the number of infected persons, but also the lack of sufficient resources, can
cause an infectious outbreak to become catastrophic. See generally Statement on the 1st Meeting
of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, WHO (Aug. 8,
2014), http://who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/.
35. See Jane E. Rutty, Religious Attitudes to Death and Post-Mortem Examinations, in THE
HOSPITAL AUTOPSY: A MANUAL OF FUNDAMENTAL AUTOPSY PRACTICE 39–57 (3d ed. 2010)
(discussing multiple religious attitudes towards death and autopsies).
36. Zika virus, first discovered in Uganda in 1947, was “considered mild compared to its
killer cousins: yellow fever, dengue, West Nile and Japanese encephalitis” because there was no
evidence that it had ever caused anyone to be hospitalized until 2013. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. et al.,
How a Medical Mystery in Brazil Led Doctors to Zika, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/health/zika-virus-brazil-how-it-spread-explained.html?_r=0.
37. Berkley, supra note 4; Cohen, supra note 4; Marty, supra note 4.
38. See, e.g., Berkley, supra note 4 (“[G]overnments, public funders and private donors need
to share the costs, and they need to do so now, rather than waiting until the next epidemic.”).
39. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2d ed.
2005) [hereinafter IHR]. Initially adopted in 1969, the IHR originally covered six “quarantinable
diseases,” later reduced to only three. Id. at 1. In 1995, “[i]n consideration of the growth in
international travel and trade, and the emergence or re-emergence of international disease threats
and other public health risks,” there was a call for substantial revision of the IHR. Id. Ten years
later, in 2005, the substantially revised IHR were adopted, and entered into force on June 15, 2007.
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Id. The IHR were strengthened to reflect lessons learned from the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) epidemic. Id. at 3; see also James G. Hodge, Jr., Global Legal Triage in
Response to the 2009 H1N1 Outbreak, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 599, 610 (2010). Unlike the
1969 IHR, the revised IHR are “not limited to any specific disease or manner of transmission, but”
rather cover any “illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, that presents or
could present significant harm to humans . . . .” IHR, supra note 39, at 1. The United States
accepted the revised IHR, subject to the following reservation and understandings:
The Government of the United States of America reserves the right to assume obligations
under these Regulations in a manner consistent with its fundamental principles of
federalism. With respect to obligations concerning the development, strengthening, and
maintenance of the core capacity requirements set forth in Annex 1, these Regulations
shall be implemented by the Federal Government or the state governments, as appropriate
and in accordance with our Constitution, to the extent that the implementation of these
obligations comes under the legal jurisdiction of the Federal Government. To the extent
that such obligations come under the legal jurisdiction of the state governments, the
Federal Government shall bring such obligations with a favorable recommendation to the
notice of the appropriate state authorities.
The Mission, by means of this note, also submits three understandings on behalf of
the Government of the United States of America. The first understanding relates to the
application of the IHRs to incidents involving natural, accidental or deliberate release of
chemical, biological or radiological materials:
In view of the definitions of “disease,” “event,” and “public health emergency of
international concern” as set forth in Article 1 of these Regulations, the notification
requirements of Articles 6 and 7, and the decision instrument and guidelines set forth in
Annex 2, the United States understands that States Parties to these Regulations have
assumed an obligation to notify to WHO potential public health emergencies of
international concern, irrespective of origin or source, whether they involve the natural,
accidental or deliberate release of biological, chemical or radionuclear materials.
The second understanding relates to the application of Article 9 of the IHRs:
Article 9 of these Regulations obligates a State Party “as far as practicable” to notify
the World Health Organization (WHO) of evidence received by that State of a public
health risk occurring outside of its territory that may result in the international spread of
disease. Among other notifications that could prove to be impractical under this article,
it is the United States’ understanding that any notification that would undermine the
ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to operate effectively in pursuit of U.S. national security
interests would not be considered practical for purposes of this Article.
The third understanding relates to the question of whether the IHRs create judicially
enforceable private rights. Based on its delegation’s participation in the negotiations of
the IHRs, the Government of the United States of America does not believe that the IHRs
were intended to create judicially enforceable private rights:
The United States understands that the provisions of the Regulations do not create
judicially enforceable private rights.
Id. at 60–61. Professor Polly J. Price notes that “[t]he Ebola outbreak also led to unprecedented
action by the U.N. Security Council.” Price, supra note 7, at 5. She further states that a U.N.
Security Council resolution on Ebola control measures was sponsored by 130 nations, “the highest
level of support for any Security Council resolution in the history of the U.N.” Id. This resolution
“called on member nations to lift travel and border restrictions in the Ebola-affected region of West
Africa, and to step up their response to the disease, which . . . was a ‘threat to international peace
and security.’” Id.
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The IHR is a legally binding agreement that provides a “framework for the
coordination of the management of events that may constitute a public health
emergency of international concern . . . .”40 The IHR defines a public health
emergency as “an extraordinary event which is determined, as provided in [the
IHR]: (i) to constitute a public health risk to other States through the
international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated
international response . . . .”41 The goal of the IHR is to “improve the capacity
of all countries to detect, assess, notify and respond to public health
threats.”42 The scope of the IHR is “to prevent, protect against, control and
provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways
that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid
unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.”43
Important provisions in the IHR include requiring each State to: designate a
national focal point accessible at all times for communications with the WHO;
meet minimum core capacities to detect, assess, report, and respond to public
health events; support disease detection and control at designated ports and
borders; develop a framework for notifying the WHO within twenty-four hours
of an event that may constitute a public health emergency of international
concern as defined by the IHR; take evidence-based actions sensitive to impact
on trade, travel, and human rights; and perform self-assessments and report to
the WHO.44
Part IV of the IHR provides that the WHO may issue certain “standing” and
“temporary” recommendations to prevent or reduce the international spread of
disease and minimize interference with international traffic.45 For specific on40. Resilience of Tourism Development: International Health Regulations, UN WORLD
TOURISM ORG., http://rcm.unwto.org/risk-crisis-management/international-health-regulations (last
visited Sept. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Resilience of Tourism Development]. In order for the IHR to
gain acceptance by the WHO member states, the framework developed as a consensus that balanced
state sovereignty with the commitment to contain the global spread of infectious disease.
Frequently Asked Questions About the International Health Regulations (2005), WHO, 3,
http://www.who.int/ihr/about/FAQ2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). The international
regulations lack enforcement mechanisms. Id. at 1.
41. IHR, supra note 39, at 9.
42. Resilience of Tourism Development, supra note 40.
43. IHR, supra note 39, at 10.
44. See generally Frequently Asked Questions About the International Health Regulations
(2005), supra note 40. An individual State cannot declare a public health emergency of
international concern; only the WHO Director can do that. Rather, a State is to notify the WHO if
it believes that there exists a public health emergency of international concern. Article 12 of the
IHR expressly states: “The Director-General shall determine, on the basis of the information
received, in particular from the State Party within whose territory an event is occurring, whether an
event constitutes a public health emergency of international concern in accordance with the criteria
and the procedure set out in these Regulations.” IHR, supra note 39, at 14.
45. Frequently Asked Questions About the International Health Regulations (2005), supra
note 40, at 2.
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going public health risks, Article 16 provides that the “WHO may make standing
recommendations [regarding] appropriate health measures . . . for routine or
periodic application.”46 With regard to specific instances of a public health
emergency of international concern, Article 15 provides that the WHO may
issue temporary recommendations on a time-limited, risk-specific basis.47
Notwithstanding the legally binding nature of the IHR on the WHO member
states, implementation of these regulations depends on the legal framework of
the individual states.48 Accordingly, each State should review and assess their
respective existing legal framework to determine compliance and ensure
implementation.49
B. U.S. Framework
In the United States, there is broad and overlapping authority among the
federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local governments to prevent the spread of
infectious disease. This interrelated system has generated conflicting regulatory
requirements.50

46. IHR, supra note 39, at 16.
47. Id.
48. International Health Regulations (2005): A Brief Introduction to Implementation in
National Legislation, WHO, 5 (Jan. 2009), http://www.who.int/ihr/Intro_legislative_implem
entation.pdf [hereinafter A Brief Introduction to Implementation in National Legislation]. In
addition to the IHR, it is worth noting that there are also various other international agreements
dealing specifically with handling, disposition and transportation of human remains, including
contagious human remains, such as (1) Council of Europe, Agreement on The Transfer Of Corpses,
signed at Strasbourg, October 26th, 1973; (2) Pan American World Health Organization, XVII Pan
American Sanitary Conference, XVIII Regional Committee Meeting, Resolution XXIX, adopted
in Washington, October 7th, 1966, International Transportation Of Human Remains; and (3)
International Arrangements Concerning the Conveyance of Corpses, signed at Berlin, February 10,
1937. These agreements and arrangements are similar to the U.S. regulations in that they require
proof of the death, proof that the person did not die of a communicable disease, and appropriate
preparation and shipment of the remains. For countries where these agreements are not in force,
the standards set forth in these agreements have become common practice to combat the spread of
disease. 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 252 (2012), https://fam.state.
gov/fam/07fam/07fam0250.html [hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL].
49. See A Brief Introduction to Implementation in National Legislation, supra note 48, at 5.
50. Lance Gable & Benjamin Mason Meier, Complementarity in Public Health Systems:
Using Redundancy As A Tool of Public Health Governance, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 224, 224–26
(2013).
These competing claims have resulted in predictable confusion about the proper role for
federal, state, and local governments in preparing for a public health emergency. This
was most striking after Hurricane Katrina, when local, state, and federal preparedness
and response efforts were heavily criticized as government entities battled uncertainties
about jurisdictional authority and took turns blaming one another for shortcomings.
Benjamin E. Berkman et. al., Assessing the Impact of Federal Law on Public Health Preparedness,
4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 155, 176 (2010).

2016]

Tears in Heaven

127

“The public health authority of the states derives from the police powers
granted by their constitutions and reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.”51 The federal government’s authority in this area is
based on the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the
General Welfare Clause under Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution.52 There has
been some critique that the federal government’s role has intruded on individual
state’s police powers.53 Conversely, there have been calls for increased
federalism because of the concern that variation among the state laws could
hinder effective management of a public health crisis.54 As a practical matter,
because of funding from the federal government and also because of various
federal laws and regulations, it is clear in the United States that the federal and
state governments are critical actors involved in preventing the spread of
infectious disease.55
There are numerous federal codes, regulations, and guidelines dealing with
the spread of infectious diseases,56 particularly sections 264–65 of Title 42 of
the U.S. Code57 and Title 42, Part 70 of the Code of Federal Regulations.58 The
federal government exercises much of its authority for protecting the public from
infectious disease through, among others, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), including
the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC).59 For example, in addition to federal authority to prevent
51. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RES. SERV., RL33201, FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE AND
ISOLATION AUTHORITY (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33201.pdf.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 18.
53. Berkman et al., supra note 50, at 157.
54. See, e.g., Gable & Meier, supra note 50, at 225.
55. See Berkley, supra note 4.
56. See, e.g., Berkman et al., supra note 50, at 158 (“The last decade has been marked by
increasing federalization of public health preparedness and response—an area that was traditionally
handled almost exclusively at the state and local level.”); see generally Selected Federal Legal
Authorities Pertinent to Public Health Emergencies, CDC, 7–10, http://www.cdc.gov/
phlp/docs/ph-emergencies.pdf (last updated Aug. 2014) (listing various statutes, regulations, and
executive orders governing the control of communicable diseases in the United States).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 264–65 (2012).
58. 42 C.F.R. pt. 70 (2015).
59. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is responsible for two national laboratories
dedicated to research on infectious diseases. The National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility focuses
on zoonotic and animal diseases. National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND
SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility (last
visited Sept. 13, 2016). The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center focuses
on infections that have bioweapon potential.
See National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/science-and-tech
nology/national-biodefense-analysis-and-countermeasures-center (last visited Sept. 13, 2016); see
also Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs), PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY,
http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/responders/ndms/teams/pages/dmort.aspx (last updated Sept.
25, 2015).
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communicable diseases entering the United States through borders or points of
entry,
[w]henever the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention determines that the measures taken by health authorities of
any State or possession (including political subdivisions thereof) are
insufficient to prevent the spread of any of the communicable diseases
from such State or possession to any other State or possession, he/she
may take such measures to prevent such spread of the diseases as
he/she deems reasonably necessary . . . .60
These rules regulating the spread of disease cannot, however, run afoul of the
U.S. Constitution.61
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the free exercise of
religion.62 In addition, the Restoration of Freedom of Religion Act of 1993
(RFRA) provides certain religious exemptions from federal laws for religious
beliefs.63 Many states have their own version of RFRA or other laws, including
religious freedom provisions in their state constitutions.64 All of these religious
rights must be analyzed in light of the state’s interest in protecting the public
from deadly infectious diseases. Generally, the government needs a compelling
reason for burdening a person’s exercise of religion and must prove there is not
a less restrictive alternative that would carry out the government’s interest.65
In a New Jersey case, where the State tried to control the spread of
tuberculosis (“TB”), a prisoner challenged a mandated TB test—the Mantoux
test—arguing that it infringed on his Christian Science beliefs which violated
the RFRA.66 The Mantoux test required a subcutaneous injection, which the
prisoner claimed violated the tenets of his faith forbidding “intrusive,
60. 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2015).
61. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (stating “that a law
repugnant to the Constitution is void”).
62. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
64. See Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 66
OKLA. L. REV. 431, 441 (2014).
65. Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D.
L. REV. 466, 478 (2010) (“Though all of the sixteen state RFRAs adopt a compelling-interest test,
they differ in what they require as a threshold—that is, they differ in what a plaintiff must initially
show in order to trigger the government’s obligation to demonstrate a compelling interest.”).
66. Karolis v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., 935 F. Supp. 523, 524 (D.N.J. 1996). In Karolis,
the prisoner also claimed that requiring the Mantoux test violated his free exercise rights under the
First Amendment. The court held that:
While free exercise claims brought by prison inmates under RFRA are subject to the
strict compelling interest test, free exercise claims brought outside RFRA are subject
only to a “reasonableness” test . . . [i]f the State meets the RFRA standards in requiring
the Mantoux test, then it clearly meets the “reasonably related” standard.
Id. at 530 (citations omitted).
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procedures.”67 The District Court of New Jersey agreed that the prisoner had
demonstrated a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion.68 However,
the court noted that the State had “a compelling state interest in preventing the
spread of TB in its prisons by detection at the earliest possible opportunity.”69
The court recognized that “TB is a highly contagious disease that is likely to
have devastating and far-reaching effects, unless the infection is held in check
by an aggressive tracking program.”70 Notwithstanding the State’s compelling
interest, the prisoner argued that he should not be forced to submit to the
Mantoux test because there were other medically approved, less restrictive
methods for TB testing, such as annual x-rays or periodic sputum samples.71 The
court was not persuaded that these alternatives, which only detected active TB,
would satisfy the government’s interest in also detecting latent TB infections,
which would be diagnosed by the Mantoux test.72 Accordingly, the court
concluded that, although the prisoner’s religious beliefs were substantially
burdened by the administration of the Mantoux test, the State had a compelling
interest in preventing the spread of TB and the Mantoux test was the least
restrictive means of doing so.73 Thus, the State’s required Mantoux test was
enforceable despite religious objections.
Preventing the spread of highly infectious disease would almost invariably be
a compelling interest.74 In the 1905 case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts,75
involving a smallpox vaccination, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a
state may use its police power to enact “health laws of every description” to
“protect the public health and public safety.”76 The Jacobson Court stressed that
the government regulation was designed to “suppress the evils of a smallpox
epidemic that imperilled an entire population.”77 In a subsequent case, Prince
67. Id. at 526.
68. Id. at 527.
69. Id. at 528.
70. Id. at 530.
71. Id. at 528.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 531.
74. See Elizabeth B. Cooper, Social Risk and the Transformation of Public Health Law:
Lessons from the Plague Years, 86 IOWA L. REV. 869, 946 (2001).
The legal evidence suggests that the relationship between religious freedom and public
health is multidimensional. Frequently, whether religious freedom is subordinate to
considerations of public health is a matter which concerns the rights of others who are
not directly party to the claims of religious liberty. In other words, the relationship
involves the right of the individual to religious liberty and, in relation to others, their right
to health.
Heather Payne & Norman Doe, Public Health and the Limits of Religious Freedom, 19 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 539, 554 (2005); see also Karolis, 935 F. Supp. at 527–28.
75. 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 25.
77. Id. at 30–31.
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v. Massachusetts,78 the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he right to practice religion
freely does not include liberty to expose the community . . . to communicable
disease . . . .”79
Government-imposed restrictions during a pandemic may infringe upon
religious practices. An individual may challenge those restrictions, asserting the
Free Exercise Clause or the federal or state RFRA. In light of Jacobson, Prince,
and other authorities, such a challenge would almost invariably be unsuccessful
because of a state’s compelling interest in curtailing the spread of contagious
diseases.80 Thus, a court is unlikely to mandate the government accommodate a
religious practice during a public health emergency.
Could a state voluntarily accommodate religious concerns even if not
mandated to do so? The Supreme Court has sanctioned voluntary religious
accommodations, as long as they comply with the limits of the Establishment
Clause.81 In his treatise on religion and American law, the eminent Professor
Boris I. Bittker noted that such discretionary accommodations “can be employed
prospectively by governments to ‘avoid conflicts between [the] secular and
religious activities’ of their citizens . . . or [they] can be instituted responsively
to eliminate or lessen a conflict that is presently occurring.”82 Thus, voluntary
accommodations are unlikely to be restricted by the Establishment Clause.
C. Religious and Cultural Practices and Accommodations
Voluntary accommodations to government-mandated restrictions on religious
and cultural practices may be beneficial in garnering community support during
a public health emergency. There are several examples where voluntary
accommodations to government mandates restricting religious and cultural
practices during a public health crisis helped or could have helped contain the
spread of infectious disease. A recent example dealt with religious death rituals
of victims during the West Africa Ebola crisis.83 Another example occurred in
the United States when Navajo cultural practices regarding the dead delayed
attempts to identify and contain the Sin Nombre virus.84

78. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
79. Id. at 166–67.
80. This assumes the least restrictive alternative is used. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38 (“So
far as [a State’s actions] can be reached by any government, they depend, primarily, upon such
action as the State in its wisdom may take; and we do not perceive that this legislation has invaded
any right secured by the Federal Constitution.”).
81. BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., RELIGION AND THE STATE IN AMERICAN LAW 276–77 (2015).
82. Id.
83. See Carrie F. Nielsen et al., Improving Burial Practices and Cemetery Management
During an Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic – Sierra Leon, 2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 20, 20 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6401a6.htm.
84. See Tracking A Mystery Disease: The Detailed Story of Hantavirus Pulmonary System
(HPS), CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/hps/history.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2012).
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Before turning to the critical review of the lessons learned during the West
Africa Ebola public health crisis, it is important to discuss generally how
infections are transmitted from cadavers. Dead bodies can and do transmit
infections to humans.85 Knowledge that cadavers can be deadly precedes our
awareness of germ theory by thousands of years.86 The earliest evidence of the
recognition that dead bodies spread disease is reflected in ancient Greek
accounts of purposely dropping cadavers into water supplies of their
adversaries.87 Medieval armies also catapulted cadavers into enemy fortresses.88
These communitites recognized not only that the bodies themselves could be
dangerous, but that clothing and materials from the deceased could be
contagious as well.89

85. See Navin Paul & Mini E. Jacob, An Outbreak of Cadaver-Acquired Chickenpox in a
Health Care Setting, 43 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 599, 599 (2006). Fortunately, other than
at a funeral service or a scene of an accident, many people in the United States rarely encounter a
dead body.
86. Compare Germ Theory, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/230610/germ-theory (last visited Sept. 13, 2016) (discussing European scientists’
development of germ theory and surgical practices in the Nineteenth century), with Daniel J.
Dire, CBRNE–Biological Warfare Agents, MEDSCAPE, http://emedicine.medscape.com/
article/829613-overview (last updated Mar. 23, 2016) (illustrating how ancient civilizations utilized
microorganisms in biological warfare against adversaries).
87. Dire, supra note 86.
88. James W. Martin et al., History of Biological Weapons: From Poisoned Darts to
Intentional Epidemics, in MEDICAL ASPECTS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 2 (Zygmunt F. Dembek
ed., 2007).
89. See, e.g., Russell Hopley, Contagion in Islamic Lands: Responses from Medieval
Andalusia and North Africa, 10 J. EARLY MOD. CULTURAL STUD. 45, 55 (2010); cf. Dire,
supra note 86 (noting that Scythian archers “infected their arrows by dipping them in decomposing
bodies” as a warfare tactic).
Ibn al-Khatib, a polymath historian who served as vizier at the Nasrid court in Granada,
seems particularly eager to dispel any disavowal of contagion. He makes the following
argument in his treatise: If one asks “How can you admit the assertion, there is infection,
when the revealed word (ash-shar) denies this?,” we answer that infection exists, is
confirmed by experience, research, insight and observation, and through constantly
recurring accounts. These are the elements of proof. For him who has treated or
recognized this case, it cannot remain concealed that mostly the man who has had contact
with a patient infected with this disease must die, and that, on the other hand, the man
who has had no contact remains healthy. So it is with the appearance of the illness in a
house or quarter because of a garment or a vessel. Even an earring can destroy him who
puts it in his ear, and all the inhabitants of his house.
Id. (alteration in original); see also Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Q&As on Transmission, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/qas.html (last updated Nov. 24, 2015) (“Ebola on dry
surfaces, such as doorknobs and countertops, can survive for several hours; however, virus in bodily
fluids (such as blood) can survive up to several days at room temperature.”).
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When a death occurs from a contagious infectious disease, the pathogens on
the cadaver can pose a public health threat.90 The risk of infection is heightened
when religious practices call for close contact with the corpse, such as when
religious leaders and family members lay hands on the dead.91 Moreover, certain
occupations regularly put workers in contact with contagious cadavers. These
higher risk occupations include medical practitioners (most notably pathologists,
other physicians, and nurses), forensic scientists, mortuary attendants and
embalmers, funeral directors, cleaning staff at hospitals or treatment centers,
emergency services personnel, human anatomy professors and students,
transplant surgeons and staff, archaeologists, and construction workers.92 The
work of these occupationally at-risk individuals can be affected, and potentially
made more hazardous, by the religious beliefs of the families of the deceased or
the religious beliefs and practices of the workers themselves.93
Deaths from infectious diseases are different from other mass casualties not
involving infectious agents. Although both scenarios are tragic, the concerns
regarding the spread of disease from human remains in the two are very
different. In most natural non-infectious catastrophes (for example, hurricanes,
floods, and earthquakes), cadavers pose only a limited health threat because
most of the common commensal organisms on the body die quickly as the

90. See Janelle A. Anderson et al., Confirming Mycobacterium Tuberculosis Transmission
from a Cadaver to an Embalmer Using Molecular Epidemiology, 43 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL
543, 543–45 (2015) (discussing the public health aspects of tuberculosis pathogens among funeral
workers).
91. Religions: Pentecostalism, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/
subdivisions/pentecostal_1.shtml (last updated July 2, 2009); see also Nielsen et al., supra note 83,
at 20.
92. There is data that indicates that DNA can survive up to ≈1 million years in cold
environments. Eske Willerslev & Alan Cooper, Ancient DNA, 272 PROCEEDINGS BIOLOGICAL
SCI. 3, 3 (2005). Also, there is ample historical data indicating that historical relics can transmit
deadly diseases. Andrea M. McCollum et al., Poxvirus Viability and Signatures in Historical
Relics, 20 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 177, 178, 182 (2014). Anthropologists unearthing
dead bodies may encounter victims from infections, some of which can survive for thousands of
years. See Katherine Haddon, Burial Site Unearthed at City of London Financial District, BUS.
WORLD (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=
burial-site-unearthed-at-city-of-london-financial-district&id=105062
(construction
workers
unearthed victims of the Great Plague as identified by anthropologists who were called to the site);
see also Christopher S. Kovacs, Jr. et al., Selecting Suitable Solid Organ Transplant Donors:
Reducing the Risk of Donor-Transmitted Infections, 4 WORLD J. TRANSPLANT. 43, 44–47 (2014)
(noting that transplant patients have a higher risk of bacterial infections); see also Anderson et al.,
supra note 90, at 543–44 (highlighting that funeral employees and embalmers were susceptible to
the risk of infection). Similarly, veterinarians, hunters, and others who deal directly with animals
can also be affected by handling animal carcasses, particularly from those that carry zoonotic
diseases, such as Ebola or Anthrax.
93. Nielsen et al., supra note 83, at 26.
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internal temperature drops and the body desiccates.94 Moreover, research
reveals that, generally, cadavers from natural disasters are no more likely to
spread disease than cadavers from deaths in everyday life.95 By contrast, the
risk of infection from cadavers becomes very high when there is a natural or
deliberate outbreak of an infectious disease.96 Cadavers become serious public
health threats when the deaths resulted from highly lethal contagious pathogens,
particularly pathogens resistant to environmental alterations or those that are
found in very high concentrations. The greatest risk of all is from lethal
pathogens where cadavers contain high levels of contagious pathogen on the
surface.97
Ebola, and its close relative Marburg, are both perfect examples of highly
contagious pathogens that exist in high concentrations on the surface of
cadavers— both human and animal.98 “Ebola virus is transmitted principally by
direct physical contact with an infected person or their body fluids during the
later stages of illness or after death.”99
Beyond Ebola, many of the pathogens that cause rashes, such as chickenpox,
have active pathogens in the rash. The body of someone who dies with a
contagious rash is highly dangerous and can cause infection even among those
persons wearing basic infection-control equipment.100 Similarly, there is also a
high risk if someone dies from an infection that releases a high concentration of
contagious bodily fluid, for example, someone who dies of cholera and is
covered with diarrheal fluids.101 In addition, when a person dies from an
infectious disease, the cadaver may have fleas, lice,102 or other vectors that could
transfer to a living person in close proximity to the cadaver, bite that person, and
transmit the deadly infection.

94. Claude de Ville de Goyet, Stop Propagating Disaster Myths, 356 LANCET 762, 762
(2000).
95. Sarah Tomkins, Priam’s Lament: The Intersection of Law and Morality in the Right to
Burial and Its Need for Recognition in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 12 U. D. C. L. REV. 93, 106–07
(2009).
96. Deliberate outbreaks may occur from bioterrorism, biowarfare, or biocrimes. See Martin
et al., supra note 88, at 15.
97. See Nielsen et al., supra note 83, at 26 (noting that improper burial practices “might have
contributed to ongoing Ebola virus transmissions”).
98. See id. at 20; Marburg Outbreak Prompts CDC to Update Guidance, 11 No. 12 OSHA
GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE FACILITIES NEWSL. 3 (July 2015) (“[T]he risk of person-to-person
transmission of viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) [Marburg] is greatest during the latter stages of the
illness when viral loads are highest.”).
99. See Nielsen et al., supra note 83, at 20.
100. Paul & Jacob, supra note 85, at 599–601.
101. See Cholera (Vibrio cholera infection), CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/cholera/general (last
updated Nov. 6, 2014).
102. Pierre-Edouard Fournier et al., Human Pathogens in Body and Head Lice, 8 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1515, 1515–17 (2002).
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Even in cases where the body does not have surface pathogens or vectors, the
body must be handled with extreme care if the person had a serious contagious
infection at death. Handling a dead body often causes the release of fluids and
air from the lungs, such that even cadavers that do not have high concentrations
of pathogens on the skin can release deadly pathogens in sufficient quantity to
spread disease if the body is not handled carefully.103
Multiple studies demonstrate that certain pathogens, such as the bacterium
that causes tuberculosis, survive in and on the body, and even survive the process
of embalming the body—in fact, pathogens can stay viable and infectious for
over a month after the embalming.104 This long viability period extends far
beyond the time when most families have claimed the body for services, which
can include open caskets that carry the risk of potential transmission from
contact with the cadaver during the funeral.105 The following table lists some of
the infectious diseases that are known to be transferrable from cadavers.
Table 1: Examples of Contagious Pathogens Transmitted from
Dead Bodies to Living Persons
INFECTIOUS AGENT
Prions106
Ebola107
Marburg108

DISEASE

Transmissible
spongiform
encephalopathy
Ebola virus disease
Marburg virus disease

WHEN DEADLY–
CAUSE OF DEATH
(MOST COMMON)
Rapidly progressive
dementia
Hemorrhagic fever
Hemorrhagic fever

103. Janine C. Correia et al., Assessing the survival of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in
unembalmed and embalmed human remains, 27 CLINICAL ANATOMY 304, 304 (2014).
104. Id. at 304, 307. Multiple studies reveal that even bodies that have been embalmed can
transmit many different pathogens. See Deniz Demiryürek et al., Infective Agents In Fixed Human
Cadavers: A Brief Review And Suggested Guidelines, 269 ANATOMICAL REC. 194, 194–95 (2002).
105. See Demiryürek et al., supra note 104, at 194–95; see also Tanya D. Marsh, Rethinking
the Law of the Dead, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1327, 1336 (2013).
106. Nicholas J. Hardin, Infection at Autopsy: A Guide for Pathologists and Autopsy
Personnel, 6 CURRENT DIAGNOSTIC PATHOLOGY 75, 75, 77 (2000) (recommending medical
professionals wipe down autopsy tables with sodium hydroxide to protect themselves from
spongiform encephalopathy transmitted by prions).
107. Peter B. Jahrling et al., Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, in MEDICAL ASPECTS OF BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE 272–73 (Zygmunt F. Dembek, ed., 2007); Peter H. Kilmarx et al., Ebola Virus Disease
in Health Care Workers – Sierra Leone 2014, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1168,
1169–70 (2014).
108. P. Gedigk et al., Die Pathologische Anatomie Der „Marburg-Virus” Krankheit [The
Pathological Anatomy of the Marburg Virus Disease], 52 VERHANDLUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN
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Hepatitis A109
Hepatitis B Virus110
Hepatitis C Virus111
HIV112
Nipah virus113
Varicella-zoster virus114

Hepatitis
Hepatitis
Hepatitis
AIDS
Nipah encephalitis
Chickenpox

Variola sp.115
Yellow Fever virus116
Lyssavirus Rabies
virus117
Poliovirus118

Smallpox
Yellow Fever
Rabies
Polio

135

Liver failure
Liver failure
Liver failure
Total immune failure
Encephalitis
Pneumonia/Encephalitis
(uncommon)
Multiorgan failure
Liver failure
Neurologic failure
Paralysis of respiratory
muscles

GESELLSCHAFT TOR PATHOLOGIE [CONFERENCES ON THE GERMAN PATHOLOGY SOCIETY] 317,
320 (1968).
109. JM Conly & BL Johnston, Natural Disasters, Corpses, and the Risk of Infectious
Diseases, 16 CAN. J. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND MED. MICROBIOLOGY 269, 269 (2005); Viral
Hepatitis – Hepatitis A Information: Hepatitis A Questions and Answers for the Public, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/hav/afaq.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
110. Kent A. Sepkowitz, Occupationally Acquired Infections in Health Care Workers, Part II,
126 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 917, 918–19 (1996); D. Wong, Infection Hazards of Human
Cadavers, WONG’S VIROLOGY ONLINE, http://virology-online.com/general/Safety11.htm; Know
Hepatitis B – Know Hepatitis B Questions and Answers, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/know
hepatitisb/faqs.htm (last updated June 19, 2013).
111. Mouna Lazrek et al., Detection of Hepatitis C Virus Antibodies and RNA Among
Medicolegal Autopsy Cases in Northern France, 55 DIAGNOSTIC MICROBIOLOGY INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 55, 55–56 (2006); Viral Hepatitis – Hepatitis C Information: Hepatitis C FAQs for the
Public, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/hcv/cfaq.htm (last updated May 23, 2016).
112. Mahlon D. Johnson et al., Autopsy Risk and Acquisition of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection: A Case Report and Reappraisal, 121 ARCHIVES OF PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY
MED. 64, 64–65 (1997).
113. Hossain M.S. Sazzad et al., Nipah Virus Infection Outbreak with Nosocomial and Corpseto-Human Transmission, Bangladesh, 19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 210, 210, 213-14
(2013).
114. Paul & Jacob, supra note 85, at 599–600.
115. T.D. Healing et al., The Infection Hazards of Human Cadavers, 5 COMMUNICABLE
DISEASE REP. REV. R61, R61–R62, R64 (1995); Oliver Morgan, Infectious Disease Risks from
Dead Bodies Following Natural Disasters, 15 PAN. AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 307, 308–09 (2004).
116. Healing et al., supra note 115, at R61–R62; Wong, supra note 110; Yellow Fever, CDC,
https://cdc.gov/yellowfever/index.html (last updated July 12, 2016).
117. See Wong, supra note 110; see also Rabies, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/rabies/index.html
(last updated Apr. 18, 2016).
118. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R61–R62; see also Global Health – Polio: What is
Polio?, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/polio/about/ (last updated Oct. 15, 2014).
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measles119
Rubulavirus mumps120
Rotavirus121
Venezuelan equine
encephalitis virus 122
Mycobacterium
tuberculosis123
Shigella124
Salmonella125
Escherichia coli126
Campylobacter
enteritis127

[Vol. 66:117

Measles

Pneumonia

Mumps
Rotavirus diarrhea
Venezuelan equine
encephalitis (VEE)
Tuberculosis

Viral meningitis
Dehydration
Encephalitis

Shigellosis (bacillary
dysentery)
Typhoid or
Paratyphoid fever
Diarrhea, can be
hemorrhagic
Traveler’s diarrhea or
food poisoning

Dehydration

Respiratory failure

Dehydration
Dehydration
Dehydration

119. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R61-R62; see also Measles (Rubeola):
Complications of Measles, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/complications.html (last
updated Feb. 17, 2015).
120. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R61–R62; see also Mumps: For Healthcare
Providers, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/mumps/hcp.html (last updated Aug. 11, 2016).
121. See Morgan, supra note 115, at 307–08; see also CDC Features: Prevent Rotavirus, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/features/rotavirus/ (last updated Nov. 17, 2015).
122. Ellen Jo Baron & J. Michael Miller, Bacterial and Fungal Infections Among Diagnostic
Laboratory Workers: Evaluating the Risks, 60 DIAGNOSTIC MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTIOUS
DISEASE
241, 242 (2008); Eastern Equine Encephalitis:
Symptoms
&
Treatment,
CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/easternequineencephalitis/tech/symptoms.html (last updated Apr. 5,
2016).
123. See SS Bakhshi, Code of Practice for Funeral Workers: Managing Infection Risk and
Body Bagging, 4 COMMUNICABLE DISEASE & PUB. HEALth 283, 283–84 (2001); see also Timothy
J. Kappel et al., The Viability of Mycobacterium Tuberculosis in Formalin-Fixed Pulmonary
Autopsy Tissue: Review of the Literature and Brief Report, 27 HUMAN PATHOLOGY
1361, 1361 (1996); see also Kurt Nolte, Survival of Mycobacterium Tuberculosis Organisms for 8
Days in Fresh Lung Tissue from an Exhumed Body, 36 HUMAN PATHOLOGY 915, 915–16 (2005).
124. See Baron & Miller, supra note 122, at 242–44; see also Susan S. Davidson & William
Benjamin, Jr., Risk of Infection and Tracking of Work-Related Infectious Diseases in the Funeral
Industry, 34 AM. J. OF INFECTION CONTROL 655, 655–56 (2006).
125. See Christopher M. Parry et al., Typhoid Fever, 347 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1770, 1774
(2002); see also David L. Sewell, Laboratory Acquired Infections, 22 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY
NEWSLETTER 73, 73–74 (2000).
126. See Sepkowitz, supra note 110, at 922; see also E. Coli Enteritis, MEDLINEPLUS,
https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/000296.htm (last updated Aug. 23, 2016).
127. Morgan, supra note 115, at 308; Campylobacter Infection, MedlinePlus, https://med
lineplus.gov/ency/article/000224.htm (last updated Aug. 23, 2016).
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Vibrio cholerae128
Yersinia pestis129
Bacillus anthracis130
Rickettsia prowazekii131
Rickettsia typhi132

Cholera
Plague
Anthrax
Epidemic typhus
Endemic typhus

Dehydration
Gram Negative Shock
Pneumonia/Sepsis
Neurologic failure
Neurologic failure

Francisella
tularensis133
Neisseria
meningitidis134
Leptospira sp.135

Tularemia

Pulmonary tularemia

Meningococcal
disease
Leptospirosis

Chlamydophila
psittaci136
Corynebacterium
diphtheriae137

Psittacosis

Neurologic
failure/Sepsis
Multi-organ failure/
hemodynamic collapse
Pneumonia/Meningitis/E
ncephalitis
Toxin induced damage
to brain, heart, and
throat (cannnot breathe)

Diphtheria

128. Healing et al., supra note 115, at R62-R63; Media Centre: Cholera, WHO,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs107/en/ (last updated July 2015).
129. Érika de Cássia Vieira da Costa et al., Seroprevalence of Hantavirus and Yersinia Pestis
Antibodies in Professionals from the Plague Control Program, 46 REVISTA DA SOCIEDADE
BRASILEIRA DE MEDICINA TROPICAL 490, 490–91 (2013).
130. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R62–R64.
131. See Robert M. Pike, Laboratory-Associated Infections: Summary and Analysis of 3921
Cases, 13 HEALTH LAB. SCI. 105, 108–09 (1976).
132. See id.
133. See Baron & Miller, supra note 122, at 242; see also WHO Guidelines on Tularaemia,
WHO 9 (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/tularemia/resources/whotularemiamanual.pdf.
134. See Healing et al, supra note 115, at R62, R64; see also Epidemiology and Prevention of
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases: Meningococcal Disease, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/
vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/mening.html (last updated July 24, 2015).
135. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R62; see also Anne Spichler et al., Using Death
Certificates Reports to Find Severe Leptospirosis Cases, Brazil, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1559, 1559–60 (2007).
136. See Baron & Miller, supra note 122, at 242; see also Compendium of Measures To Control
Chlamydia Psittaci Infection Among Humans (Psittacosis) and Pet Birds (Avian Chlamydiosis),
1998, 47 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1–3 (1998).
137. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R62; see also Diphtheria, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/diphtheria/ (last updated Jan. 15, 2016).
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Borrelia recurrentis138

Relapsing fever

Bordetella pertussis139

Whooping cough

Clostridium tetani140
Coxiella burnetii141

Tetanus
Q fever

Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA)142
Streptococcus
pyogenes143

MRSA

Mycobacterium
leprae144
Brucella145
Aspergillus species146

Leprosy

Pneumonia/Sepsis/
Necrotizing
fasciitis/Toxic Shock
syndrome, etc.
Progressive debilitation

Brucellosis
Aspergillosis

Sepsis
Fungal Pneumonia

Streptococcal sore
throat, Scarlet fever,
Impetigo, etc.

Neurologic
Failure/hepatic
failure/myocarditis/
Bronchopneumonia
Pneumonia/encephalopat
hy/seizures
Neurologic over-activity
Pneumonia/Hepatitis/
Meningitis
Pneumonia/Sepsis

138. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R61–R62; see also Relapsing Fever, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/relapsing-fever/overview.html (last reviewed Nov.
10, 2012).
139. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R62; see also Pertussis (Whooping Cough), CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/pertussis/ (last updated Jan. 26, 2016).
140. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R62; see also Tetanus – the Disease, WHO,
http://www.who.int/immunization/topics/tetanus/en/index1.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
141. See Baron & Miller, supra note 122, at 241–42; see also Q Fever – California, Georgia,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, 2000-2001, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 924, 924
(2002).
142. See Davidson & Benjamin, Jr., supra note 124, at 655–56; see also Invasive
Staphylococcus Aureus Infections Associated with Pain Injections and Reuse of Single-Dose Vials
– Arizona and Delaware, 2012, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP..501, 501–02 (2012).
143. See Davidson & Benjamin, Jr., supra note 124, at 655–56; see also Theresa L. Lamagni et
al., Predictors of Death after Severe Streptococcus Pyogenes Infection, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1304, 1304 (2009).
144. See Healing et al., supra note 115, at R62; see also Didier Pin et al., Mycobacterium
Species Related to M. Leprae and M. Lepromatosis from Cows with Bovine Nodular Thelitis, 20
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2111, 2111, 2114 (2014).
145. See Bakhshi, supra note 123, at 283–84; see also Baron & Miller, supra note 122, at 241–
42; see also Sewell, supra note 125, at 73–74.
146. See Kovacs, Jr. et al., supra note 92, at 49 (indicating that fungal infections of
Aspergillosis have been documented when transferring organs between the critically ill donor and
recipient); see also Aspergillosis Overview, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/health/
guides/disease/aspergillosis/overview.html?print=1 (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
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Histoplasma
capsulatum 147
Coccidioides sp.148
Blastomyces
dermatitidis 149

Histoplasmosis

Fungal Pneumonia

Coccidioidomycosis
Blastomycosis

Plasmodium
falciparum150

Malaria

Entamoeba
histolytica151

Amebic dysentery

Fungal Pneumonia
ARDS (Acute
Respiratory Distress
Syndrome)
Cerebral Malaria,
anemia/hemodynamic
failure, or renal failure
Dehydration or Intestinal
obstruction

From a scientific and safety perspective, anyone handling the cadaver of a
person who died from an infectious disease should use appropriate personal
protective equipment (PPE), be well trained in the procedure of using PPE, and
use work space precautions such as ultraviolet germicidal irradiation.152 These
ideal scientific practices, however, are often in direct conflict with religious
beliefs and potentially violate moral values and cultural customs.
1. Lesson Learned: West Africa Ebola Crisis
The post-mortem handling of Ebola patients played a major role in a
significant increase in the number of Ebola infections in the West Africa
outbreak.153 These additional Ebola infections were primarily attributed to
family and community members performing certain religious rites over the

147. See Sewell, supra note 125, at 75; see also Sanjay G. Revanker & Jack D. Sobel,
Histoplasmosis, MERCK MANUALS, http://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/infectiousdiseases/fungi/histoplasmosis (last modified Jan. 2014).
148. See Sewell, supra note 125, at 75; see also Fungal Pneumonia: A Silent Epidemic
Coccidioidomycosis (Valley Fever), CDC, 2 (Dec. 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/fungal/pdf/coccifact-sheet-sw-us-508c.pdf.
149. See Sewell, supra note 125, at 75; see also Jason J. Emer & Joel B. Spear, Primary
Cutaneous Blastomycosis as a Cause of Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome, 2 J. CLINICAL &
AESTHETIC DERMATOLOGY 22, 22 (2009).
150. DPDx – Laboratory Identification of Parasitic Diseases of Public Health Concern:
Malaria, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/dpdx/malaria/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2013).
151. DPDx - Laboratory Identification of Parasitic Diseases of Public Health
Concern: Amebiasis, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/dpdx/amebiasis/index.html (last updated Nov. 29,
2013).
152. Chetan Jinadatha et al., Disinfecting Personal Protective Equipment with Pulsed Xenon
Ultraviolet as a Risk Mitigation Strategy for Health Care Workers, 43 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL
412, 413 (2015).
153. New WHO Safe and Dignified Burial Protocol - Key to Reducing Ebola Transmission,
WHO (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2014/ebola-burial-protocol/en/.
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deceased.154 Persons who die of Ebola have very high levels of the Ebola
virus on their skin and in any leaked bodily fluids,155 putting anyone who
comes in close contact to these bodies in grave danger. 156 Additionally, the
virus may remain contagious on the decedent’s personal belongings. Thus,
when family members either touch the body or distribute the decedent’s
personal property, they can contaminate themselves and others.
The need for community buy-in and respect for religious beliefs became
evident during the West Africa Ebola crisis.157 A case in Guinea provides an
example. In June 2014, a pregnant Guinean woman died of Ebola;
unfortunately, this was not surprising given that pregnant women are among the
most vulnerable to Ebola.158 What was surprising was the heated quarrel that
followed her death. Mourners refused to allow the “‘[d]ead body management’
team[s]” of outsiders to bury her Ebola-infected corpse.159 The community
members shouted that she had to be “saved from eternal wandering” where her
spirit would haunt the village; she needed to reach the village of the dead and,
to do this, her fetus had to be removed from her body, she had to be properly
washed, and prayers had to be recited over her prepared corpse.160 Notably, their
traditional Kissi culture requires that a woman not be buried with her fetus
because burying a woman with her fetus still inside would disturb the world’s
natural cycles. The Kissi believe that the failure to remove the fetus would alter
the natural beginning and ending cycle among humans, animals, and plants.161
In the Kissi belief system, no risk from Ebola was worth the far greater risk of
altering the order of the universe.162
154. See id. (Statement of Dr. Pierre Formenty) (“At least 20% of new Ebola infections occur
during burials of deceased Ebola patients.”).
155. See Nielsen et al., supra note 83, at 20; see also Joseph Prescott et al., Postmortem
Stability of Ebola Virus, 21 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 856, 857 (2015).
156. See Nielsen et al., supra note 83, at 20; see also Prescott et al., supra note 155, at 857.
157. During the recent West Africa Ebola crisis, it became evident that it is extremely difficult
to deal with the conflict between religious practices and modern scientific preventive measures
because the affected community is comprised of people with illiteracy rates of thirty to seventynine percent.
Statistics at a Glance: Guinea, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/
infobycountry/guinea_statistics.html (last updated Dec. 26, 2013); Statistics at a Glance: Liberia,
UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/liberia_statistics.html (last updated Dec. 27, 2013).
158. Erika Check Hayden, Ebola’s Lasting Legacy, 519 NATURE 24, 25 (2015); Amy
Maxmen, How the Fight Against Ebola Tested a Culture’s Traditions, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan.
30, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/01/150130-ebola-virus-outbreak-epidemicsierra-leone-funerals/.
159. See Maxmen, supra note 158; see also Gail Sullivan & Justin Moyer, In Traumatized
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, Ebola Chaos, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/08/in-traumatized-liberia-and-sierra-leoneebola-chaos/.
160. Maxmen, supra note 158.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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The WHO’s team of scientists and doctors was frustrated. The woman’s body
was oozing a myriad of deadly virus, such that opening her body to extract the
fetus would put everyone involved at an extreme risk of Ebola even though they
were wearing PPE.163 The team was aware that a dead body from someone who
dies of Ebola has the highest levels of the virus.164 The team’s concern was that
the unbelievably high concentrations of Ebola virus on the deceased pregnant
woman would contaminate their PPE to inordinate levels if they were to extract
the fetus, making later removal of the PPE extremely hazardous.165
Because the Kissi were preventing the team’s access to the woman’s body for
burial, the district medical offices solicited the help of anthropologist Julienne
Anoko, who “knew there must be ways to make reparations to the spirits for
ceremonies that could not be performed as tradition demanded.”166 Anoko
“‘found a very old man whose grandfather was one of the ritualists in charge of
reparations,’ . . . ‘[h]e had inherited the reparation ritual . . . .’”167 The elder
explained the ritual, which required “a goat, 12 yards of white tissue, salt, oil,
and rice.”168 Anoko astutely provided each item and was relieved when, at
sunset, “she watched the ceremony begin with the distribution of smooth kola
nuts, symbols of respect.”169 While the ceremony was ongoing, elsewhere,
“burial workers in sweltering hot Tyvek suits hygienically laid the pregnant
woman to rest.”170
Another example from the West Africa Ebola crisis occurred in 2014 when
Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf decreed that the bodies of Ebola victims
were to be cremated.171 Many people became so distressed that they kept their
sick relatives home.172 This led to a huge surge in Ebola cases in Liberia.173 If

163. See Katharina Bögel & Eva-Maria Schwienhorst, Cultural Awareness in Times of Ebola,
MEDICAL PEACE WORK, 7, 16 (2015), http://www.medicalpeacework.org/fileadmin/user_upload/
Case_Studies/MPW3_15_06.pdf (recounting the story of how the Kissi tribe became upset when
international health care workers wearing PPE did not respect the Kissi burial traditions because a
deceased tribal woman had Ebola).
164. See id.
165. See id. at 5, 7, 16 (explaining that the handling of human remains should be kept to a
minimum, and thus removal of the fetus would create too much contact with the contaminated
body).
166. Maxmen, supra note 158.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Ebola Cremation Ruling Prompts Secret Burials in Liberia, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 24,
2014, 2:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/ebola-cremation-ruling-secretburials-liberia.
172. Id.
173. Id. (noting that the number of bed spaces at the Ebola treatment center doubled).
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the Ebola victim died, the relatives performed secret burials.174 Pursuant to
traditional practices, in preparation for the burials, the relatives would wash and
dress the bodies.175 These clandestine burials, using traditional unsafe practices,
led to even more infections.176 Recognizing that the only way to stop the practice
of secret burials was to, once again permit burials, with certain precautions. The
government devised a safer burial system using specially trained burial teams
that attempted to respect some of the religious and cultural traditions.177 In
Sierra Leone, a similar issue arose when President Ernest Bai Koroma “advised
citizens to put aside their normal cultural activities, especially those dealing with
burial rites.”178 He expressly banned private burials, and this ban, combined
with the ban on Christmas celebrations, led to major protests.179 In a story
reporting events from Sierra Leone, Dr. Angela Dunn discussed the need for
cultural sensitivity with regard to burial practices.180 She explained that
“prevention and control is crucial in containing the Ebola epidemic . . . .”181 She
noted that to implement effective Ebola infection prevention and control
measures, “the local culture needs to be considered.”182 Dunn reports that, in
Sierra Leone, rituals and burial practices “are mostly determined by religion,
local traditions, and secret societies. Fear of the consequences of not following
these customs can be more powerful than the fear of Ebola.”183 In Sierra Leone,
it is believed “that keeping traditional burial practices not only allows the
deceased to pass on to a greater existence, but it also ensures that the village will
be protected from hardships.”184 Moreover, “if the burial practices are
disregarded, the deceased will be forced to wander the Earth tormenting the
village with misfortunes.”185

174. Id.
175. Helene Sandbu Ryeng, A Safe Burial for an Ebola Victim in Liberia, UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/liberia_79760.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2015).
176. Id.
177. Id. (describing how the local community donated a parcel of land to be used as a
cemetery).
178. Mohamed Massaquoi, In Kailahun: Bondo Women Demand Right to Bury Head Sowie,
CONCORD TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), http://slconcordtimes.com/in-kailahun-bondo-women-demandright-to-bury-head-sowie/.
179. Id.; see also Sierra Leone Bans Christmas Celebrations, Cites Ebola, VOICE OF AM. (Dec.
13, 2014), http://www.voanews.com/content/sierra-leone-bans-public-christmas-celebrations/255
7792.html.
180. See Angela C. Dunn, CDC Responder Stories: Stories from the Field: Infection
Prevention & Control – Sierra Leone, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/stories-angeladunn.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2015).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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In accordance with IHR, the WHO declared the West Africa Ebola outbreak
a public health emergency of international concern and issued temporary
recommendations on August 8, 2014.186 The temporary recommendations
recognized the risk from burial practices. The WHO expressly provided that
States with Ebola transmission “should ensure funerals and burials are
conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of
the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with national health
regulations, to reduce the risk of Ebola infection.”187
Because of the continuing concerns regarding burial rituals, the WHO
developed a twelve-step protocol for culturally sensitive safe burials.188 The
protocol, issued in October 2014, was “[d]eveloped by an interdisciplinary team
at [the] WHO, in partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and faith-based organizations including the
World Council of Churches, Islamic Relief, Caritas Internationalis and World
Vision . . . .”189 The twelve-step protocol provides more specific guidance for
culturally sensitive burials.190 The guide cautions that before proceeding with
the protocol, the burial team should obtain the deceased family’s agreement. In
addition, those managing the burial must fully apprise the family of the decedent
about the burial procedure and inform them of their “religious and personal
rights to show respect for the deceased” before beginning the burial process.191
The protocol further provides that the burial team should include a religious
representative and a communicator, who are to work together with the family to
decide how to conduct a dignified burial in the particular social and religious
context.192 With respect to Christian and Muslim decedents, the WHO’s twelvestep protocol includes specific procedures for their dignified burial. For
example, to avoid religious rituals of washing or otherwise touching the body,
the protocol provides that Christian burial procedures may include safe religious

186. Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola
Outbreak in West Africa, WHO (Aug. 8, 2014), http://who.int/mediacentre/news/
statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/.
187. Id. The WHO also provided that, for States with Ebola transmission, “[t]he cross-border
movement of the human remains of deceased suspect, probable or confirmed EVD [Ebola Virus
Disease] cases should be prohibited unless authorized in accordance with recognized international
biosafety provisions.” Id.
188. Field Situation: How to Conduct Safe and Dignified Burial of a Patient Who Has Died
from Suspected or Confirmed Ebola Virus Disease, WHO, 1–17 (Oct. 2014), http://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/137379/1/WHO_EVD_GUIDANCE_Burials_14.2_eng.pdf
[hereinafter Field Situation]. Unfortunately, the WHO protocol was not issued until November
2014, eleven months after the start of the outbreak.
189. New WHO Safe and Dignified Burial Protocol - Key to Reducing Ebola Transmission,
supra note 153.
190. Field Situation, supra note 188, at 1.
191. Id. at 1.
192. See id. at 2.
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rites, such as sprinkling blessed water over the body and reading scripture.193 As
to burials of Muslim decedents, instead of an ablution, which is normally
performed with water, the protocol provides for a dry ablution.194 In addition,
rather than using dark-colored body bags, the Muslim protocol uses white body
bags, which could represent the burial shroud if permitted by the Imam.195
To continue the coordination and assess preparedness the WHO convened a
meeting in Geneva, Switzerland in January 2015 that included more than 150
participants and subsequently published a report titled “Ebola Virus Disease
Preparedness: Taking Stock and Moving Forward” (“Taking Stock Report”).196
In addition to discussing the immediate need for technical and financial support,
infrastructure, training, and other resources, the participants discussed the
importance of community engagement and communication. They listed the
following key points:
 Community engagement is the corner stone to the response to the
EVD [Ebola Virus Disease] outbreak. Without effective community
engagement, contact tracing and breaking chains of transmission is
extremely difficult.
...
 The critical nature of communications with communities, especially
in countries where communications is through the spoken word was
highlighted. Many of the cultural practices which have enabled the
transmission of EVD have been curtailed during the emergency, but it
is felt that these changes, such as changes in funeral practices, should
be maintained in the long term, as it is uncertain where this disease
may recur.197
Significantly, with regard to burial practices, the Taking Stock Report
provides key recommendations and action points for safe burials as follows:198
RECOMMENDATIONS
 Increase capacity for dead body
management
 Establish teams in charge of
safe burials

ACTION POINTS
 Consider research on local
customs and funeral rites and
anthropological studies
recommended to understand local
culture.

193. Id. at 6.
194. Id. at 7–8.
195. Id. at 7. Unfortunately, during the early stages of the West Africa Ebola crisis, the only
body bags that were available on site were the dark-colored bags, not the white body bags, which
created significant issues.
196. Ebola Virus Disease Preparedness: Taking Stock and Moving Forward, WHO, 5 (Jan.
16, 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/preparedness-meeting-report/en/.
197. Id. at 9.
198. Id. at 26.
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 Update safe burial protocols
with regard to religious practice

 Disseminate existing guidelines
or articles.

 Identify safe burials sites

 Train and equip National teams
to perform safe burials activities

Additionaly, the CDC issued several guidelines on practices for preventing
the spread of Ebola in West Africa.199 The CDC’s guidelines are not as detailed
as the WHO’s twelve-step protocol for culturally sensitive burials. The CDC
guidelines do, however, mention some steps for safe, respectful burials. For
example, the December 2014 pamphlet titled “Ebola Must Go: Bury All Dead
Bodies Safely” notes that government-imposed safe burial practices may be
“very difficult for the family and the community” and that safe burial teams “will
talk to the family members about the different ways they can pay respect without
touching the body.”200 The pamphlet further provides that, as part of the process,
a religious leader can attend the burial.201 In addition, specifically in regards to
the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, the CDC published an important report
documenting the need for “plans to effectively and safely handle the bodies of
persons who have died from Ebola, and to execute these plans in a dignified and
respectful manner that honors the deceased, their families, and their
communities.”202 The report notes that “[r]apidly scaling up of safe, dignified
burial practices and focusing on increasing community acceptance of safe
burials during an Ebola epidemic could interrupt transmission substantially.”203
Unlike the guidelines for West Africa, the CDC’s guidelines for the United
States do not appear to include specific protocols for culturally sensitive burials.
What might be the reason for the difference between the CDC’s West Africa
guidelines and the U.S. guidelines? One reason could be discerned from the part
of the CDC’s website dedicated to Ebola. The CDC’s Ebola website provides
that most of the Ebola deaths in the United States “would likely occur within a
hospital setting.”204 Accordingly, its guidance on safe handling of Ebola victims
199. Interim Guidance for Managing Patients with Suspected Viral Hemorrhagic Fever in U.S.
Hospitals, CDC,
2–3 (May 19, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/vhf-interimguidance.pdf.
200. Ebola Must Go: Bury All Dead Bodies Safely, CDC, 4 (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.cdc.
gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/bury-body-safely.pdf.
201. Id. at 8.
202. Nielsen et al., supra note 83, at 27.
203. Id. (citation omitted).
204. Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Guidance for Safe Handling of Human Remains of Ebola
Patients in U.S. Hospitals and Mortuaries, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcareus/hospitals/handling-human-remains.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2015).
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in the United States is directed to “[p]ersonnel who perform postmortem care in
U.S. hospitals and mortuaries.”205 Perhaps because of the assumption that deaths
in the United States would occur in hospitals, the CDC guidelines do not
specifically include the culturally sensitive protocols suggested by the WHO.
Another reason why the CDC’s guidelines for the United States might not
expressly specify culturally sensitive burial protocols is because the CDC
generally defers to the individual states for such matters.206
This deference to the individual states is also evident in earlier policies of the
CDC. For example, recognizing the frontline role of the individual states in
public health emergencies, after 9/11 and following the anthrax exposures in the
fall of 2001, the CDC turned to the Centers for Law and the Public’s Health, a
collaboration between Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities, to draft a
model act that states could adopt to assist in the “prevention, detection,
management, and containment of public health emergencies[,]” including
bioterrorism and epidemics.207 The final draft of the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) was released on December 21, 2001.208
The preamble to MSEHPA provides that it attempts to strike a balance to
“contain emergency health threats without unduly interfering with civil rights
and liberties.”209 Despite some criticism, a majority of states have adopted at
least some of the provisions of MSEHPA.210 The MSEHPA framework is meant
to apply in times of a “public health emergency.”211 MSEHPA provides that the
term “public health emergency” includes “an occurrence or imminent threat of
an illness or health condition that: (1) is believed to be caused by . . . (i)
bioterrorism; [or (ii)] the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or
eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin,” where there is a high probability
of “a large number of deaths[,]” “a large number of serious or long-term

205. Id.
206. COLE, supra note 51, at 6.
207. The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: A Draft for Discussion Prepared by the
Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, CDC, 8
(Dec. 21, 2001), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf [hereinafter MSEHPA].
208. Id. at 1.
209. Id. at 9.
210. “The extent to which [MSEHPA’s] provisions were incorporated into each state’s laws
varies.” Ctr. for L. & Pub.’s Health, Model State Emergency Health Powers Act Legislative
Surveillance Table 1, http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Surveillance.pdf
(last visited Sept. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Legislative Surveillance Table]. Some of the variations
are purely semantic, where others may be more substantive. Most of the state statutes have not
been put to the test regarding their effectiveness in terms of highly infectious disease. Thus, it is
important that states use every instance to learn from various incidents, whether in the United States
or abroad, to insure that their versions adapt to new developments.
211. MSEHPA, supra note 207, at 6.
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disabilities[,]” or “widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses
a significant risk of substantial future harm . . . .”212
MSEHPA includes a provision dealing specifically with the safe disposal of
human remains during public health emergencies.213 Section 504 of MSEHPA
provides in relevant part:
Section 504 SAFE DISPOSAL OF HUMAN REMAINS. The public health
authority may exercise, for such period as the state of public health
emergency exists, the following powers regarding the safe disposal of
human remains—
(a)
ADOPT MEASURES. To adopt and enforce measures
to provide for the safe disposal of human remains as may be
reasonable and necessary to respond to the public health
emergency. Such measures may include, but are not limited
to, the embalming, burial, cremation, interment,
disinterment, transportation, and disposal of human
remains.
(b)
POSSESSION. To take possession or control of any
human remains.
(c)
DISPOSAL. To order the disposal of any human
remains of a person who has died of a contagious disease
through burial or cremation within twenty-four (24) hours
after death. To the extent possible, religious, cultural,
family, and individual beliefs of the deceased person or his
or her family shall be considered when disposing of any
human remains.214
Notwithstanding MSEHPA, states are not consistent in terms of their laws for
handling infectious human remains.215 Not all states adopted MSEHPA.216
Even states that adopted many of MSEHPA’s other provisions did not adopt

212. Id. at 11.
213. Id. at 23–24.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. Compare id. (delineating a model statute with separate and distinct provisions for the
process of disposing of infectious remains), with 77 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 690.1200 (2016) (adding
a precaution not included in the MSEHPA that “the body shall be labeled ‘infection hazard,’ or
with an equivalent term to inform persons having subsequent contact with the body, including any
funeral director or embalmer, to take suitable precautions”), and N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. FRL.
§ 801.13 (2016) (requiring a crematory only to accept delivery of a body that dies of an infectious
disease unless it is delivered by “(1) A funeral director; (2) The next-of-kin; or (3) A designated
agent”).
216. See Legislative Surveillance Table, supra note 210, at 2–4 (providing a chart showing
which states have adopted the different provisions of MSEHPA and demonstrating that twelve
states have still not adopted any of the provisions). The Legislative Surveillance Table may not
reflect subsequent adoptions.
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section 504.217 Moreover, some states that adopted the general provision of
section 504 did not adopt section 504(c) dealing with the disposal of infectious
human remains within twenty-four hours or they omitted the qualifying language
concerning respect for religious beliefs.218
For example, South Carolina and Wyoming appear to have provisions similar
to section 504 of MSEHPA, giving the state health authorities significant latitude
for the safe disposal of human remains during public health emergencies and
allowing for disposal within twenty-four hours.219 Neither, however, includes
the language in section 504(c) accommodating religious beliefs.220 Although
Ohio’s statute provides for disposal within twenty-four hours, it varies
significantly from MSEHPA with regard to religious accommodations.221
Ohio’s statute expressly prohibits a public or church funeral for a person who
died from a communicable disease and forbids taking the cadaver “into any
church, chapel, or other public place.”222 By contrast, a few states: Iowa, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Oregon, expressly track the language of
section 504(c) providing for accommodation of religious beliefs.223 Even if a
state’s version of MSEHPA does not specifically include the religious
consideration provision, other laws in those states may afford the surviving
family members similar consideration for their religious beliefs and permit them
to perform religious death rituals as long as they comply with medicallyapproved protocols.
2. Lesson Learned: Sin Nombre Outbreak
Another concern is the potential risk posed by death from an unknown
infection. When someone dies of symptoms that are clearly from an infection,
but the infectious agent has not been identified prior to death, there is a serious
risk that the death was caused by a pathogen not previously recognized by
217. Id. at 3 (showing that only thirteen states have adopted section 504 of the MSEHPA). The
Legislative Surveillance Table may not reflect subsequent adoptions.
218. Some statutes have a twenty-four hour timeline, but do not include any religious
accommodations. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.19 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-320
(2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-241 (2016).
219. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-320(A)(1)–(2) (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-241(a)(i), (iii)
(2016).
220. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-320 (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-241 (2016).
221. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.19 (West 2016).
222. Id.
223. Compare id. (“No public or church funeral shall be held in connection with the burial of
such person, and the body shall not be taken into any church, chapel, or other public place.”) with
IOWA CODE § 135.144 (2016), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-7 (West 2016), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1210A-6 (2016), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 6502 (West 2016), and OR. REV. STAT. § 433.449
(2016) (“To the extent practicable, religious, cultural, family and individual beliefs of the deceased
person or the deceased person’s family shall be considered when disposing of any human
remains.”).
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medicine, a pathogen not known in the territory where the person died (newly
imported), or a pathogen not properly analyzed prior to the death.224 The
pathogen that caused such death, particularly if the pathogen is a novel infectious
agent or a recently imported contagious agent, needs to be identified
immediately.
In late May 1993, the laboratories at the CDC and the Armed Forces Institute
in Washington (AFIP), as well as several other government laboratories,
received word of a cluster of patients dying of an unknown respiratory illness in
the Four Corners region of the United States.225 The statement noted that there
were sporadic reports of individuals with an acute respiratory disease that
included fever, headache, muscle aches, and cough that quickly deteriorated into
respiratory failure and death.226 Laboratory studies showed that they were
negative for typical bacterial and viral pathogens; even tests for Yersinia pestis
(i.e., the plague) were negative.227
These sporadic cases were overlooked until May 1993, when a particular
event brought the illness to medical attention. Merrill Bahe, a physically fit
otherwise healthy nineteen-year-old Navajo man was rushed to the Indian
Medical Center emergency room in Gallup, New Mexico, suffering from
shortness of breath.228 Bahe had been driving with his sister-in-law to Gallup to
attend the funeral of his fiancée, Florena Woody.229 “Early in the 55-mile trip
. . . Bahe too began gasping for breath. His sister-in-law stopped the car and
called 911, then administered CPR until an ambulance rushed him to the Gallup
Indian Medical Center.”230 Despite the best efforts in the emergency room, it
was too late and Bahe was dead.231
Bahe’s quick death was alarming because he was young and an exceptionally
healthy athlete – a star runner.232 More alarming, however, was that his fiancée
had died five days earlier after presenting similar symptoms.233 Woody, a
twenty-one year old Navajo woman, went to the Gallup Indian Medical Center
emergency room complaining of flu-like symptoms and sudden, severe

224. “These transmissions tax the health care system and the knowledge of physicians in the
home country to whom the new microbe may be unknown, and diagnosis and treatment more
difficult.” Cohen, supra note 4.
225. William Plummer, The Death Bug, PEOPLE MAG. (June 21, 1993),
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20110656,00.html.
226. Id.
227. Id.; see also Outbreak of Acute Illness – Southwestern United States, 1993, 42 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 421, 421 (1993).
228. Plummer, supra note 225.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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shortness of breath.234 Her lungs were full of fluid and she died of respiratory
failure shortly thereafter.235 Dr. Bruce Tempest, the chief of medicine at Gallup
Indian Medical Center, knew of Woody’s death, and was on call when Bahe was
brought in to the emergency room.236
When Tempest learned of an earlier similar death at the Gallup
hospital and two others in Arizona, he was puzzled. He ordered tests
to determine whether Bahe had succumbed to plague, which is
endemic to the [Four Corners]. When results came back negative,
Tempest contacted Dr. Gary Simpson, the [New Mexico Department
of Health’s] medical director for infectious diseases.237
According to traditional Navajo belief, those who are living are not to talk
about a recently deceased person until at least four days after that person’s death
to ensure that person’s safe journey to the next world.238 Despite the immediate
threat of an unknown deadly infection in the Four Corners area, adherence to the
Navajo religious beliefs thwarted information gathering by scientists and the
media.239
“News of deaths from the mystery disease traveled quickly” and soon more
and more cases were recognized.240 No one knew the cause and people became
afraid of contagion from each other.241 Meanwhile other cases were quickly
reported to the New Mexico Department of Health, Arizona Department of
Health Services, Colorado Department of Health, and Utah Department of
Health.242 By June 7, 1993, they had identified twenty-four cases, including
persons from all of the four corner states (New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and
Colorado), with a fifty percent mortality rate.243
Fortunately, Dr. Bruce Tempest’s recognition that something suspicious was
going on led to autopsies of both Bahe and Woody.244 Woody’s lungs at autopsy
were twice the normal weight.245 Tissue and serum samples were sent to the
CDC in Atlanta, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious

234. See id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Outbreak of Acute Illness – Southwestern United States, 1993, supra note 227, at 421.
243. Id.
244. Steve Sternberg, Tracking a Mysterious Killer Virus in the Southwest, WASH. POST (June
14, 1994), https://washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/wellness/1994/06/14/tracking-a-mys
terious-killer-virus-in-the-southwest/5e074ccd-7d88-41c0-9dc4-c0edcc1cd16e/.
245. Denise Grady, Death at the Corners, DISCOVER MAG. (Dec. 1, 1993), http://discover
magazine.com/1993/dec/deathatthecorner320.
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Diseases (USAMRIID) in Maryland, and the AFIP in DC. It took a month, but
by June studies had demonstrated that there was a cross-reaction with Hantan
viruses and the CDC published its first report of the event, although they had not
yet identified the species.246 The studies permitted special cloning and
sequencing of virus ribonucleic acid (RNA) from human autopsy tissues,
revealing that all three of the RNA segments were from a new virus unlike those
of any known Hantavirus.247 “[T]he [USAMRIID] isolated the virus from
specimens from [the autopsy of] a person in New Mexico and from a rodent in
California.”248 We now have evidence that the Sin Nombre virus has been in
the United States for decades. Studies on stored autopsy tissues using the CDC
tests have confirmed that a thirty-eight year old Utah man had died of the disease
in 1959.249 Curiously, although the medical community was not aware of the
Sin Nombre virus until 1993, the Navajo tribe had recognized a similar disease
in their medical traditions and even recognized its association with mice.250 The
virus eventually received the name of Sin Nombre virus.
The four-day Navajo delay period might have been avoided if anthropologists
or others had been consulted during the initial period of the investigation. The
anthropologists could have suggested that the Navajo community talk about
members who had died previously (albeit not within the four days) in order to
glean valuable information from those earlier deaths. Such information might
have been helpful in preventing spread of the previously unknown disease.
The Sin Nombre outbreak highlights the challenges involving cultural beliefs
in conflict with best public health practices and the need to work with the
affected community. It also emphasizes the importance of testing for unknown
infectious causes. When someone presents an unknown, though clearly
infectious disease, it may be necessary to collect fluids and tissues and perform
tests to establish if the infection results from a new pathogen, a highly contagious
pathogen, or a pathogen newly introduced into a community.251
MSEHPA contains specific provisions regarding testing and autopsies.
Further, section 606 of MSEHPA provides:

246. Id.; see also Tracking a Mysterious Disease: The Detailed Story of Hantavirus Pulmonary
Syndrome (HPS), CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/hps/history.html (last reviewed Aug. 29,
2012) [hereinafter Tracking a Mysterious Disease] (describing the origin of the name of the virus).
It was originally named the Muerto Canyon virus, but because of cultural beliefs and protests by
the Navajo, several other names were proposed, none of which were accepted by the Navajo, with
the result that the virus eventually received the name, “Sin Nombre” virus.
247. Grady, supra note 245.
248. Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome – United States 1993, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 45, 45 (1994).
249. Tracking a Mysterious Disease, supra note 246.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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Section

606 COLLECTION OF
PERFORMANCE OF TESTS. The public

LABORATORY
SPECIMENS;
health authority may, for such
period as the state of public health emergency exists, collect specimens
and perform tests on living persons as provided in Section 602 and
also upon deceased persons and any animal (living or deceased), and
acquire any previously collected specimens or test results that are
reasonable and necessary to respond to the public health emergency.252
While the term “autopsy” does not appear in section 606, that section would
most likely be interpreted to include the authority to perform an autopsy. This
interpretation can be gleaned from the term “tests” and the term “specimens.”
The term “tests” is defined in section 104(p) of MSEHPA as including “any
diagnostic or investigative analyses necessary to prevent the spread of disease
or protect the public’s health, safety, and welfare.”253 The term “specimens”
includes “blood, sputum, urine, stool, other bodily fluids, wastes, tissues, and
cultures necessary to perform required tests.”254
New Jersey’s version of section 606 expressly allows the authorities to
“perform an autopsy” when “there is a need to investigate any human deaths
related to [a] public health emergency . . . .”255 Section 606 does not appear to
have been adopted by many states. Other states, such as Delaware and South
Carolina, appear to have adopted section 606 of MSEHPA without significant
modification.256
Unlike section 504(c) of MSEHPA, which takes into account religious
considerations when disposing of human remains, section 606 does not include
any similar provision for accommodating religious beliefs.257 Autopsies and

252. MSEHPA, supra note 207, at 31 (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 11.
254. Id.
255. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-7 (West 2016).
256. Compare MSEHPA, supra note 207, at 31–32 (providing that a public health authority
may collect specimens and perform tests upon a deceased person to respond to a public health
emergency), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3138 (West 2016) (authorizing public health officials
to perform tests on deceased persons during a public health emergency), and S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-4-550 (2016) (adopting substantially the same provision of Section 606 of the MSEHPA
permitting health officials to test and acquire specimens from deceased persons to respond to a
public health emergency).
257. For a discussion of section 504(c) of MSEHPA, see supra notes 213–23 and
accompanying text. Iowa’s version of MSEHPA combines the provisions regarding disposal of
human remains and testing in one statutory section, which allows for accommodating religious
beliefs as follows:
If a public health disaster exists, the department, in conjunction with the governor, may
do any of the following . . .
2. Adopt and enforce measures to provide for the identification and safe disposal of
human remains, including performance of postmortem examinations, transportation,
embalming, burial, cremation, interment, disinterment, and other disposal of human
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other testing, however, may conflict with a number of religious beliefs and
practices.
Apart from MSEHPA, some states have laws dealing with autopsies that
include provisions regarding religious objections. For example, in Louisiana, a
coroner may perform an autopsy where a death results from a virulent contagious
disease.258 If the decedent’s family objects on religious grounds, the statute
provides that the coroner should not perform the autopsy “unless the coroner
finds that the facts surrounding the death require that an autopsy be performed
in the interest of the public safety, public health, or public welfare.”259 Similarly,
Rhode Island law provides that “in the absence of a compelling public necessity,
no dissection or autopsy shall be performed over the objection of a surviving
relative or friend of the deceased that the procedure is contrary to the religious
belief of the decedent.”260 A “compelling public necessity” under the statute is
found when “discovery of the cause of death is necessary to meet an immediate
and substantial threat to the public health and that a dissection or autopsy is
essential to ascertain the cause and/or manner of death . . . .”261
Even if a state does not have a statute explicitly requiring consideration of
religious objections before the state can perform an autopsy, a state’s Restoration
of Freedom of Religion Act may require a similar examination of the state’s
compelling interest.262 A state’s interest in testing for and diagnosing a pathogen
that may cause a pandemic would likely override any religious objections to an
autopsy.
III. SURVIVORS’ RIGHTS TO HUMAN REMAINS AND THE IMPORT OF RELIGIOUS
AND CULTURAL BELIEFS
During a public health emergency, laws may permit governmental authorities
to disregard survivors’ wishes regarding the deceased.263 Religious and cultural
beliefs surrounding death are, however, deeply ingrained in many communities.
Death rituals are viewed as critical for the survivors and for the deceased’s safe
transfer into the afterlife. Prohibiting families from performing such rites is

remains. To the extent possible, religious, cultural, family, and individual beliefs of the
deceased person or the deceased person’s family shall be considered when disposing of
any human remains.
IOWA CODE § 135.144 (2016).
258. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5713(A)(13) (2016).
259. Id. § 13:5713(D).
260. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-4.1(a) (2016).
261. Id. § 23-4-4.1(b)(1)(ii).
262. For a discussion of restoration of freedom of religion acts and a state’s interest in
preventing the spread of contagious disease, see supra notes 63–80 and accompanying text.
263. See MSEHPA, supra note 207, at 6.
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viewed as an insult and places the decedent, the decedent’s family, and the
decedent’s community in spiritual peril.264
The cultural imperative to bury one’s dead is rooted in thousands of
years of civilization. The description, in the Iliad, of King Priam
infiltrating the Greek camp at night, to beg Achilles to return his son
Hector’s body for burial is still considered one of the most powerful
scenes in western literature.265
There are several scholars whose works include thoughtful pieces on the “law
of the corpse” or the “law of the body.”266 Their separate works inform much
of the discourse on rights to the handling or disposition of human remains.
Professor Radhika Rao notes that the “law of the body is currently in a state of
confusion and chaos. Sometimes the body is characterized as property,
sometimes it is classified as quasi-property, and sometimes it is not conceived
as property at all, but rather as the subject of privacy rights.”267
Courts are often faced with deciding difficult issues regarding survivors’
rights to human remains. In 2014, a court was asked to decide whether human
remains are “property” for purposes of partition. In Wilson v. Wilson,268 a father
petitioned a Florida court to declare the ashes of his deceased son as
“property.”269 The mother objected to partitioning her son’s remains on
religious grounds, arguing “the next of kin have only a limited possessory right
to the remains for disposition purposes.”270 In a well-reasoned opinion, the court
agreed with the mother and stated “[c]ommon law, our supreme court, and this
Court have always held that a decedent’s remains are not property.”271 The
Wilson court analyzed this issue by “traveling back in history to reflect on how
deceased bodies and ashes have been viewed over time.”272 It noted that Sir
264. See Rutty, supra note 35, at 41–45.
265. Emeagwali v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., No. 29765/98, 2006 WL 435813, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 22, 2006).
266. See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones: Post-Mortem Markets in Human Tissue, 26
NOVA L. REV. 421, 425–29 (2002); Mary L. Clark, Keep Your Hands Off My (Dead) Body: A
Critique of the Ways in Which the State Disrupts the Personhood Interests of the Deceased and His
or Her Kin in Disposing of the Dead and Assigning Identity in Death, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 47
(2005); Ann M. Murphy, Please Don’t Bury Me Down in That Cold Cold Ground: The Need for
Uniform Laws on the Disposition of Human Remains, 15 ELDER L.J. 381, 401 (2007); Radhika
Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 363 (2000); Eloisa C.
Rodriguez-Dod, Ashes to Ashes: Comparative Law Regarding Survivors’ Disputes Concerning
Cremation and Cremated Remains, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 312 (2008);
Marsh, supra note 105, at 1327–28.
267. Rao, supra note 266, at 363; see also Charo, supra note 266, at 425–29 (describing some
of the history governing the development of the law in this area).
268. 138 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
269. Id. at 1177.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1178 (citation omitted).
272. Id. at 1177.
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William Blackstone, in 1753, in discussing the law in this area, stated that “the
heir has a property in the monuments and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he
has none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action against such
as indecently at least, if not impiously, violate and disturb their remains, when
dead and buried.”273 The Wilson court continued its review of the development
of the law in this area by observing that the “historical basis for this thinking
was derived in part from the English view that ‘the secular tribunals would
protect the monument, the winding-sheet, the grave-clothes, even down to the
ribbon (now extant) which tied the queue; but the Church would guard the skull
and bones.’”274 The Wilson court then jumped forward in the historical
development of the law of remains. It noted that, in 1986, the Florida Supreme
Court articulated that “‘[a]ll authorities generally agree that the next of kin have
no property right in the remains of a decedent[,]’”275 but rather have a limited
right to “possession of the body . . . for the purpose of burial, sepulture or other
lawful disposition . . . .”276 The court also relied on a 2001 Florida Supreme
Court case, which stated that survivors’ entitlement to possession of the remains
for purposes of burial or other disposition “is not a property right, nor does it
make the remains ‘property.’”277
In Wilson, the court was only faced with the issue of whether human remains
are property and did not need to address whether survivors may have other
potential rights, such as tort claims.278 In the United States, the development of
the law with regard to survivors’ other rights to human remains can also be
traced back more than a century.
In Larson v. Chase,279 a Minnesota Supreme Court case decided in 1891, in
which a wife brought a claim “for damages for the unlawful mutilation and
dissection of the body of [her] deceased husband[,]” the court had to determine
whether the wife’s cause of action could be maintained.280 The defendant
contended that the wife’s claim for mental anguish did not provide sufficient
grounds for a cause of action because “a dead body is not property and that
mental anguish and injury to the feelings, independent of any actual tangible
injury to person or property” is not actionable.281 In analyzing this issue, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota explained that “the English common-law
authorities are not very helpful or particularly in point” for purposes of
273.
274.
1857)).
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 1177–78 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *429).
Id. at 1178 (quoting In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Bradf. Sur. 503, 522 (N.Y Sur. Ct.
Id. (quoting State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986)).
Id. at 1178 (citing Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950)).
Id. (citing Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 988 (Fla. 2001)).
Id. at 1177.
50 N.W. 238 (Minn. 1891).
Id. at 238.
Id.
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determining rights to dead bodies in the United States because, in England, “the
ecclesiastical courts assumed exclusive jurisdiction of such matters.”282 The
English common law “refused to recognize the idea of property in a corpse, and
treated it as belonging to no one unless it was the church.”283 Because of the
absence of ecclesiastical courts in the American colonies, the courts used
common law principles to develop the parameters of rights concerning the
body.284
The Larson court’s pragmatic opinion, however, sidesteps the debate over the
property concept by noting:
But this whole subject [i]s only obscured and confused by discussing
the question whether a corpse is property . . . . The important fact is
that the custodian of [i]t has a legal right to its possession for the
purposes of preservation and burial, and that any [i]nterference with
that right by mutilating or otherwise disturbing the body is an
actionable wrong.285
Accordingly, the Larson court found that the surviving spouse, as the person
entitled “to the possession and custody of [the body] for purposes of decent
burial[,]” has “legal rights to . . . it which the law recognizes and will protect.”286
Numerous courts since Larson have agreed that such rights to bring actions
for disturbance of human remains before burial exist, such that “[i]nterference
with immediate possession of the body of the decedent, even if only for a matter
of minutes, may trigger liability.”287 In a recent New York case, Emeagwali v.
Brooklyn Hospital Center,288 parents sued a hospital for improper disposition of
the body of their stillborn daughter, arguing that the hospital deprived “them of
a chance to conduct a religious burial ceremony for [their] child and causing
emotional distress.”289 The court recognized that it is “well settled that next of
kin have the absolute right to possession of a decedent’s body for the
preservation and burial of same and that damages will be awarded against any
person who unlawfully interferes with the that right or improperly deals with the
decedent’s body.”290 The question for the court was whether this right also
applied when the body was that of a stillborn fetus.291 The court noted that there
was some conflicting testimony as to whether the fetus in this case was briefly
alive upon delivery or stillborn, but determined that the parents’ rights were not
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dependent on whether the fetus was ever alive after delivery.292 The New York
court found the reasoning of a similar Connecticut case compelling. In the
Connecticut case, the plaintiff went into pre-mature labor at nineteen weeks and
delivered a non-viable stillborn fetus.293 Without the mother’s consent, the
hospital performed a post-mortem pathology involving dissection.294 In this
case, although the fetus was clearly not born alive, the court found that the
mother had an actionable claim.295 The court reasoned that, even though the
fetus was not born alive, “the mother nonetheless retains a quasi-property right
in the body because fetuses, stillborn or not, have symbolic importance vastly
different from that of ordinary tissue due to the physical presence mothers feel
in their body and the hopes and dreams she had for its future.”296
The development of these quasi-property rights to the body, coupled with
increasing respect for individual autonomy, has led to state laws allowing the
decedent to direct the disposition of the decedent’s own remains. Generally, if
there are such instructions from the decedent, those instructions govern. Absent
any direction from the decedent, state law will generally defer to the decedent’s
survivors for instructions for the handling and disposition of the body.297
These decedent’s directives as to final disposition, and the rights of survivors
to possession of the decedent’s body for purposes of burial or other disposition
and actions for interference with those rights, are, however, subject to important
qualifications. Professor R. Alta Charo explains that even as these rights were
developing, “[t]he family’s interest in the dead body was subject to various
interests of the state government, including concern for public sensibility, [and]
promotion of public health . . . .”298 Similarly, Professor Mary L. Clark
recognizes that the interests of survivors in the disposition of a decedent’s
remains may be subject to a “valid countervailing state interest, where such
interests may include concerns for public health, nuisance, or the full and proper
conduct of criminal investigations, which may well necessitate autopsies or
exhumations contrary to the wishes of the individuals involved.”299 These
important qualifiers are critical today in light of the need to stem the spread of
deadly infectious disease.
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IV. PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION
How would U.S. citizens react if they had neighbors becoming ill every day?
Would they turn to their pastors, rabbis, or clerics? In times of crises, would
more people rely on their faith? Would they halt their religious practices?
Would religious followers allow for government mandated health measures or
insist on their traditions? Would they take their loved ones to hospitals when
infected with pathogens or would they try to keep them home? Would they
attempt home treatments and burials?300 Would they trust the federal
government? Would they trust state or local government? Are the various laws
clear, consistent, and culturally sensitive such that they may be readily and
effectively applied, especially in times of public health emergencies?
Addressing all of these difficult and nuanced questions require thinking in
expansive ways for solutions.
All too often societies wait for a disaster or a critical event to unfold before
taking action or adopting laws and regulations to reduce the risk from such
events.301 People may overreact and not easily relinquish long-standing
cherished cultural and religious beliefs. A lesson learned from the West Africa
Ebola crisis is that, without trust and respect, the community will not heed
critical medical advice and will often turn to religious beliefs in preference to
scientific principles.302
Governments have a critical role to play in preventing pandemics. Prior to
the next pandemic, governments should be prepared to implement medically
sound measures that are acceptable to different communities. The need to
understand religious and cultural beliefs and rituals of the community that are
likely to hinder the goals of curtailing infections is a necessary predicate to
developing a system that is adaptable, acceptable to the community, and
scientifically sound. With the help of historians, anthropologists, ethicists,
religious leaders, epidemiologists, and thoughtful interdisciplinary effort, the
goal of devising scientifically valid systems that nevertheless have better
chances of acceptance should be easier to reach. This is not revolutionary.
There is evidence that religious leaders, during various historical instances of
disease outbreak, were sensitive to the need to protect their communities from
infectious disease and allowed variations to traditional practices. For example,
in the Middle Ages, during the time of the black plague, rabbinical leaders
allowed changes to usual burial procedures for those who died of the contagious
disease.303 Similarly, a Muslim medical treatise authored during the black
plague instructed the community in the most effective means of avoiding the
300. Home funerals are becoming more popular, something that could be of great risk during
an outbreak of a highly communicable deadly disease. See generally Marsh, supra note 105.
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plague and served “as a guidebook designed to show physicians in Granada the
path by which accommodation with religious orthodoxy could be reached.”304
In modern times, there are instances of religions dispensing with certain
required rituals during pandemics. A recent article analyzes how certain
Catholic sacraments can be provided logistically under canon law when patients
are infected with Ebola or other highly contagious diseases.305 The article
explains that these sacraments generally require the clergy and lay ministers to
come in close contact with the patient.306 The authors sought input from
“bishops, priests, a canon lawyer, an epidemiologist, a physician, the CDC, and
others” to determine how pastoral visits could occur given the isolation policies
for these patients and the risks to the pastors and lay ministers.307 In regard to
the Sacrament of Anointing of the Sick, for example, although the normal
procedure requires a priest to use his own hand to anoint the patient’s forehead
and hands with oil while saying the prescribed prayers, in grave circumstances,
a priest may use an instrument rather than his hands.308 The authors concluded
that, “with the approval of local, state, and federal health officials, pastoral care,
including provision of the sacraments, is possible. It would require proper
training, proper equipment and policies, and a significant commitment of
time.”309 The authors further recognized that priests and ministers would be at
some risk, but the risks “seem reasonable given the inestimable benefits of
receiving the sacraments during critical illness.”310
These examples of religion accommodating science and medicine during
pandemics demonstrate needed flexibility and adaptability by religious leaders.
Similarly, secular laws need to be flexible and accommodate religious practices
that are medically sound in order to insure that emergency measures will be
accepted by the community in times of crises. It is important that laws include
rapid consultation with recognized experts in contagious disease threats,
whatever the threat is, and regulations be based on the best available scientific
understanding of the nuances of the particular threat agent. However, that is not
enough; it is equally critical that the recommendations based on science are also
either already within the scope of what will be culturally and religiously
acceptable to the population at risk, or be adaptable within that cultural, spiritual,
and social framework—underscoring the need for an interdisciplinary, proactive
approach to the development of laws, regulations, and plans.
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To achieve these goals, leaders and policymakers should support
anthropological studies on local cultures, research identifying religious practices
surrounding the care of gravely ill community members and death rituals,
provide training, and equip teams for dignified and safe handling of severely
contagious patients and human remains. In addition, policymakers should reach
out to religious and other community leaders to educate those communities
more effectively on public health issues, foster trust, and enhance lines of
communication with the goal of curtailing the spread of highly infectious
diseases.
If the United States does not act preemptively, it will likely find itself in a
situation where it will be important to ask if the government failed to engage in
appropriate planning and mitigation efforts that would have reduced disaster
vulnerability when a contagious disease crisis arises. A recent critique of
governmental responses to the Zika outbreak admonishes that the “lesson of
SARS, avian flu, swine flu and Ebola is that political resolve and funding
flourish after a threat has exploded—and shrivel once the immediate danger
abates.”311
Latitude is warranted when governments are under the pressures and demands
of a public health emergency. However, prior to such emergencies, the
government is expected to plan by continually assessing and updating its laws,
regulations, and procedures.312 Preparedness is key.
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